

CAN YOU EXPECT THE BOSS TO BE ETHICAL?
THE EFFECTS OF THE BOSS' POWER AND
STATUS ON SUBORDINATES' TRUST

by

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ABSTRACT

In many organizations, the power an employee has is dependent on the position he/she holds within the organization. Whereas a great deal of research has examined the effects that power can have on those who possess it, this research examines how others perceive individuals who hold powerful positions, particularly those who have direct power over them, and predicts that others will have less trust for more powerful individuals than they will for those who are equally powerful. Furthermore, it is predicted that this negative effect of power on trust occurs because others have higher expectations that powerful individuals will engage in unethical behavior, but that this effect can be attenuated by the amount of status the powerful individual is perceived to have. Some evidence is found in four experimental laboratory studies and one survey study for some of these hypotheses. An agenda for future research is suggested, including a discussion of the practical and theoretical implications of the findings of this research.

Dedicated to Michelle, Kaymi, Stephen, Matthew, and Emma, who have provided the courage, inspiration, and motivation to embark on and ultimately complete this journey.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

According to the United States Census Bureau's statistics of U.S. businesses, as of 2012, there were approximately 6 million companies operating within the United States. Although these organizations often share certain characteristics such as industry, location, or size, each one is unique. Even organizations that may seem very similar to employees or outsiders can differ in a variety of ways, such as their organizational culture, values, business model, etc. On the other hand, despite the many ways that organizations differ from each another, there is at least one characteristic that researchers have argued is ubiquitous and an inherent aspect of all organizations: hierarchy (Bollen, Ittner, & Euwema, 2012; Brief & Smith-Crowe, forthcoming).

Hierarchy is typically defined as a "rank ordering of individuals along one or more socially important dimensions" (Anderson & Brown, 2010, p. 57). Although the nature of these social dimensions can vary widely across organizations (Anderson & Brown, 2010; Magee & Galinsky, 2008), researchers have described hierarchy as being fundamental, inevitable, normal, pervasive, and unrelenting in organizations (Leavitt, 2005; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Within an organization's hierarchical structure, there is typically an uneven distribution of power among the employees, and researchers have long recognized that this uneven power distribution has an impact on employees' responsibilities and their ability to coordinate their work, regardless of their position

within the organization (Blau, 1968, 1970; Weber, 1947). In this dissertation, I will argue that this uneven distribution of power, that often stems from people's position within an organization, affects the ethical expectations and trust that those who are less powerful have for those who are more powerful. Within organizations, those who hold positions with greater power and responsibility often have job titles that include words such as manager, supervisor, executive, director, president, and lead, indicating the power and control they have over others within the organization (Fleming & Spicer, 2014). In contrast, those at the bottom are typically identified as subordinates, indicative of their lower ranking and less powerful positions. Thus, within organizations, much of an employee's power stems from the position he/she holds.

In the extant literature, research on power has focused largely on those individuals who have power or feel powerful, examining how positions or feelings of power affect their own perceptions and behaviors (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Fast & Chen, 2009; Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; Overbeck, 2010; Tost, 2015). Without discounting the importance of the perspective of those in positions of power, I will argue that it is also important to understand how people with power are perceived by others, especially by those with less power, and how the amount of power people have can influence the way they are perceived and treated by others. Since powerful people can use their power for good (e.g., Bill Gates, Nelson Mandela) or for bad (e.g., Bernie Madoff, Adolf Hitler), power is not an inherently positive or negative construct, thus those without power have to rely on the expressed attitudes and behaviors of those who have power to determine whether they will use their power for either helpful or harmful purposes.

It is important to recognize that power can also affect the behaviors of those who

do not have it, or who are subject to those with it. For example, sometimes those with less power blame their own actions on explicit or tacit directions from their more powerful superiors, such as in the My Lai massacre when a U.S. military officer claimed he was just following orders from his superior to explain and excuse the massacre of dozens of innocent civilians (Kelman & Hamilton, 1989), or during World War II when a German commander and Nazi leader felt justified in his ordering millions of innocent people to their deaths in concentration camps because he felt that he was obeying the law given him by his superiors (Arendt, 1963). Similarly, Milgram (1974) experimentally demonstrated the influence that authority figures can have on others' compliant behavior, and subsequently, obedience to authority has been cited as an explanation for many of the unethical and corrupt behaviors that occur within organizations today (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Brief, Buttram, & Dukerich, 2001; Brief, Dietz, Cohen, Pugh, & Vaslow, 2000). Thus, power not only affects those who possess it, but it can also have a significant impact on those who the powerful have control over.

Even though previous research on power examining the perspective of the person who has (or does not have) power (e.g., Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Galinsky et al., 2003; Kipnis, 1972; Righetti et al., 2015; Whitson et al., 2013) is useful and important, there is much less research that has examined how power, or a person who has power, is perceived by others (some exceptions include Blader & Chen, 2012; Fragale, Overbeck, & Neale, 2011, Magee, 2009; Overbeck, Tiedens, & Brion, 2006). In this dissertation I address this gap in the literature by adopting a perceiver perspective and examining how people with less power view those who have more power over them. Even though being in a low power position is a more common experience for most people within

organizations (Georgesén & Harris, 2000), most of the literature neglects this perspective (Overbeck, 2010). Despite this imbalance, the extant power literature is still helpful to make predictions about how the powerful are perceived by less powerful others because the behaviors of those with power are often very visible to those around them. I argue that even though most of us may not hold positions of power or otherwise possess a sense of power over others, it is likely that we often interact with those who are powerful, and through our own experiences, as well as those vicarious experiences that we either observe or hear about, we are familiar with the actions and mannerisms of those who are powerful. Thus, while incorporating the paucity of literature that examines how powerful people are perceived by less powerful others, I also draw from the substantial amount of research that examines the effects of power on those who actually possess it, arguing that those with less power are likely to be aware of many of the tendencies of the powerful illustrated through the research findings in this literature. Specifically, I will argue that in hierarchical relationships, an individual's power, or lack thereof, can have an impact on others' attitudes towards and behavioral expectations of him/her. In particular I will focus on the relationship between trust and power and argue that an individual's power can impact how much those whom they have power over will trust and cooperate with him/her, and that this relationship is dependent on the behavioral expectations people have for the powerful individual.

Nearly 15 years ago, Wells and Kipnis (2001) stated that "the inter-relationship between control, power, and trust has not been investigated to any extent in the organizational literature" (p. 601). Despite this and other more recent calls for additional research examining the relationship between power and trust (Colquitt, Scott, & LePine,

2007; Robinson, Wang, & Kiewitz, 2014), 15 years later, the state of the literature remains much the same, and we still have a relatively poor understanding of the relationships between these variables. I argue that these relationships are important, and that this lack of understanding is not due to a lack of importance or organizational relevance, but an indicator that this is an aspect of organizational behavior that needs to be better understood.

In this dissertation, I will attempt to address this gap in the literature and respond to these calls to develop our understanding of the relationship between power and trust. I will begin with an examination of the consequences of having power for the power holder—since this is where most of the extant power research is focused—concentrating especially on those consequences that are likely to be most visible and relevant to those with less power beneath them. I will then more explicitly discuss the perceptions that those with less power have of those with more power, highlighting the need to better understand how a target's perceived power can affect how much others trust him/her. I then propose that this relationship between power and trust can be explained by the ethical behavioral expectations that people have for a powerful person. Finally, I will conclude by arguing that a person's perceived status interacts with his/her perceived power to differentially affect others' expectations of that person's ethical behavior.

Power

As with many constructs in organizational and social psychology, researchers have had a difficult time developing an accepted and generally agreed upon definition of power (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Overbeck, 2010). Previous research has

defined power as one's control over outcomes (Fiske, 1993), the amount of influence one has over others' behavior (Simon, 1957), or simply as influence and psychological change (French & Raven, 1959). A more recent definition proposed by Magee and Galinsky (2008) defines social power as "asymmetric control over valued resources in social relations" (p. 361). Consistent with much of the more recent literature on power in organizations, this is the definition of power that I adopt in this dissertation.

The study of power within organizations has a certain allure that has captured the attention and interest of scholars, practitioners, and the general public for many years. In a general sense, one has only to glance at a newspaper or browse through a website to recognize the attention that powerful people receive, whether it is the latest controversial statement by a powerful politician, the actions of a powerful world political leader, or the strategic movements and earnings reports of a powerful corporation. In the scholarly domain, researchers have examined power in a variety of disciplines including political science (Levi & Stoker, 2000), psychology (Fiske, 1993), negotiations (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2001), social psychology (Fiske & Berdahl, 2007; Overbeck, 2010), sociology (Stryker, 1990), and organizational behavior (Magee & Galinsky, 2008; Pfeffer, 1981, 1992). Since power has been argued to be so pervasive within organizations, it comes as no surprise that it has generated such an intense amount of interest from both the academic and business communities.

Consequences of Having Power

In the 19th century, Lord Acton articulated his now famous perspective that "power tends to corrupt...absolute power corrupts absolutely...[and that] great men are

almost always bad men” (Lord Acton, 1887). In reference to this adage, David Kipnis (1972) questioned whether or not power actually can corrupt those individuals who possess it. Drawing on passages from the Federalist Papers where former U.S. president James Madison stated that people’s natural tendency is to be vindictive and ambitious, Kipnis found that those who were given power devalued others’ contributions more and viewed those who were less powerful as objects of manipulation. He concluded that “power is disruptive of harmonious social relations and drastically limits the possibilities that the power holder can maintain close and friendly relations with the less powerful” (p. 39), or in other words, power can corrupt! One reason that power exerts this corrupting influence is because power causes people to feel that they can act without interference or other significant social consequences (Keltner et al., 2003; Weber, 1947), and to feel more immune to situational influences that might otherwise keep them from engaging in negative behaviors (Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson, & Liljenquist, 2008). Those in positions of power may develop this sense of immunity because of acquired idiosyncrasy credits, which allow them greater privilege to violate group norms and deviate from behavior that is otherwise expected of members of the group (Hollander, 1958; Overbeck, 2010). Thus, those in power essentially “earn” the right to engage in negative, counter-normative behaviors, often without worrying about or even recognizing potential negative repercussions of their actions, and behave in a more disinhibited manner.

Related to this sense of disinhibition, Keltner and colleagues (2003) argued that increased power causes individuals to engage in approach (i.e., less inhibited) behaviors, behaviors that are characterized by greater positive affect, increased focus on rewards,

and increased goal-oriented behavior. These behaviors are similar to behaviors people engage in when they are intoxicated with alcohol (i.e., drunk) (Hirsh, Galinsky, & Zhong, 2011), and are often quite visible and recognizable to those around them. Subsequent research has confirmed that this greater sense of freedom to act on their desires can lead the powerful to objectify others and view them simply as means to accomplish their own goals (Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, & Galinsky, 2008), regardless of the consequences for those others around them (Galinsky et al., 2003; Overbeck & Park, 2006). Indeed, power causes people to focus more on themselves (Pitesa & Thau, 2013) and dedicate more resources to themselves in laboratory experiments (Rucker, Dubois, & Galinsky, 2011). Thus while the powerful people are focusing on themselves and using others for their own instrumental purposes, I argue that those with less power who are being used by the powerful are likely to recognize this lack of genuine concern the powerful have for them, and have less positive views of their powerful counterparts in these relationships as a result.

Due to their being more responsive to goals, rewards, and opportunities, the powerful are less likely to be attentive to those with less power, and thus be more inclined to stereotype them, as opposed to those with less power who are likely to be more attentive to those in higher power (Fiske, 1993; Fiske & Berdahl, 2007; Keltner et al., 2003). Overbeck and Park (2006) described this experience as “a sadly common experience: that the boss is oblivious to those around him” (p. 227). Subsequent research has demonstrated this positive association between power and stereotyping (Fiske & Dépret, 1996; Goodwin, Gubin, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 2000; Smith & Trope, 2006), and although there are instances where power does not lead to stereotyping (Overbeck &

Park, 2001, 2006), these usually occur when individuating others (instead of stereotyping) helps the powerful to achieve their goals. Thus, even though it is possible that stereotyping may not always be perceived negatively by those with less power, this behavior seems to be the default for those with power, unless individuating others will help them to accomplish their goals.

Consistent with the evidence presented thus far, there is a plethora of other research that has shown a variety of other consequences—mostly negative or undesirable—of power. This research includes studies involving an actor's psychological sense of power as well as those involving an actor's structural power stemming from an actual position of authority. Specifically, power generally leads to increased risky behavior (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Fast, Gruenfeld, Sivanathan, & Galinsky, 2009), increased overconfidence (Fast, Sivanathan, Mayer, & Galinsky, 2012), less conformity to situational influences (Galinsky et al., 2008), less altruistic behavior (Lammers, Galinsky, Gordijn, & Otten, 2012), less reciprocal emotional responses (e.g., compassion) to others' suffering (Van Kleef et al., 2008), less willingness to sacrifice for another's benefit (Righetti et al., 2015), more unfair behavior towards others (Blader & Chen, 2012), and increased social distance (Lammers et al., 2012; Magee & Smith, 2013). Although a majority of these findings were demonstrated using student populations where there was little to no established relationships between participants, one exception to this is the research of Righetti and colleagues' (2015) whose findings were based on studies in which participants were either one or both individuals involved in romantic relationships. These findings demonstrate that these effects of power are not only limited to contact between strangers, but may also affect individuals in established

and even close relationships. Indeed, Pfeffer (2013) described the world of power as one where people's efforts are often rewarded because of self-promotion and ingratiation, and that the behaviors that people engage in that cause us to perceive them as powerful include "breaking rules, displaying anger, [and] not being warm and nice" (p. 273). Indeed, recent research has even shown that people's sense of power can drive their tendency to engage in unethical behavior (Dubois, Rucker, & Galinsky, 2015). Unfortunately, many of these negative effects occur nonconsciously (Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001; Smith & Galinsky, 2010), thus they are often likely to occur outside of the powerful person's awareness. Since most of these findings imply an interpersonal interaction between a powerful person and another individual (e.g., less altruistic behavior *towards* another), from the perspective of the less powerful person, power is likely to have a negative connotation, and the effects—especially interpersonal—of power are also likely to be perceived as negative.

It is important to recognize that power may not always lead to negatively perceived behavior. As mentioned earlier, power causes people to engage in unconstrained goal-directed behavior, regardless of whether that behavior has positive or negative consequences (Galinsky et al., 2003; Whitson et al., 2013). Thus, powerful people could behave more prosocially if this behavior helps them to accomplish their goals, or if a positive response happens to be the most salient option for an individual to approach (Hirsh et al., 2011). For example, in the moral domain, DeCelles, DeRue, Margolis, and Ceranic (2012) found that power increases one's moral awareness, resulting in *less* self-interested behavior among individuals with a strong moral identity, but *more* self-interested behavior among those with a weaker moral identity. Thus,

sometimes it depends on the unique characteristics and goals of the powerful person whether power is likely to lead them to engage in more positive or more negative behaviors.

The consequences of power discussed up to this point have focused on the powerful and how power influences their perceptions and behaviors. I have focused on these consequences because they help to paint a picture of how a powerful person behaves. Since powerful people are attended to more carefully by others (Keltner et al., 2003), their behaviors are noticed more and receive more attention. Thus, less powerful people are much more likely to be aware of the actions of a focal powerful actor than those who have equal or greater power than the actor. The picture that the literature paints of powerful individuals is largely negative, and I argue that this is similar to the way that these individuals are actually perceived by those with less power in real organizations. I now examine the scant research that has explicitly examined how less powerful individuals—in the way they have been defined here as having less asymmetrical control over resources—perceive more powerful others.

Perceptions People Have of the Powerful

Throughout most of the power literature, the perspectives held by individuals with less power, especially their perceptions of their powerful counterparts, are largely ignored (Overbeck, 2010). As Overbeck notes, “although low-power conditions are included in most research, the goal still seems to be the development of a psychology of *power*; perhaps our future work will lead us closer to a psychology of *power and powerlessness*” (p. 38). Although there is less research from the perspective of the less powerful, the

arguments and findings from what *has* been done illustrate that those who are less powerful recognize the negative tendencies and behaviors of the powerful, and that their impressions and assumptions about them and their predicted behavior are also negative as a result. For example, Overbeck and colleagues (2006) found that actions of the powerful are perceived as dispositionally motivated whereas the actions of those without power are perceived as situationally motivated. In particular, when a target's power was high, perceivers viewed the individual as having more agency to act according to his/her desires, and thus as more responsible for his/her choices. In other words, the powerful are seen as having fewer constraints on their behavior.

Earlier I highlighted how idiosyncrasy credits (Hollander, 1958) essentially give license to a powerful person to engage in counter-normative behaviors. The premise behind this idea is that the powerful—who have acquired these credits—can get away (up to a point) with engaging in deviant behaviors that those who have not acquired these credits would not be able to get away with. This is pertinent to the perspective of the less powerful though because they—as the other members of the group—are the ones who allow the powerful to get away with these behaviors. Even though, as Overbeck (2010) states, most people perceive the powerful quite negatively and with distrust, it is slightly ironic that although we have these negative views of those in power, we have the tendency to give them more leeway to engage in the very behaviors that cause us to perceive them in a negative light in the first place.

As an extension of the finding that power leads power holders to be more action oriented (Galinsky et al., 2003) and less constrained in their behavior (Overbeck et al., 2006), Magee (2009) tested whether observers inferred a target person's power based on

the target's action orientation. Magee demonstrated that people who displayed a greater action orientation were indeed perceived to be more powerful than those who displayed less action orientation. The specific types of actions that perceivers viewed as more powerful included implementation (instead of deliberation) in decision making, voting to change (instead of voting to not change) a policy from the status quo, and taking physical action (instead of taking no action) toward achieving a personal goal. As described earlier, Pfeffer (2013) similarly highlighted that people infer others' power as others engage in actions such as breaking rules and not being warm or nice. This strengthens the argument that less powerful perceivers correctly recognize those who are powerful based on their actions, whether those actions are positive or negative.

Emotions—particularly negative emotions—also influence people's perceptions of the powerful. For instance, researchers have shown that when individuals express anger (as opposed to sadness), others perceive them as being more powerful (Pfeffer, 2013; Tiedens, 2001). These findings demonstrate a positive relationship between displaying anger and being perceived as powerful. Similarly, Langner and Keltner (2008) showed that being subjected to a partner's increased power is associated with increased negative emotion. Thus, less powerful people anticipate negative behavior and emotions from those who are powerful and experience greater negative emotions themselves when interacting with them.

Other research shows that low and high power people have different views about how power affects the relationship between members within organizations, a difference that researchers have referred to as a "power gap" (Willemyns, Gallois, & Callan, 2003). Specifically, they show that less powerful members are better, and more powerful

members are worse at recognizing the distance between organizational members caused by power differences between them and that these differences are much more salient to those with less power than they are to those in high power positions, especially in negative relationships (see also Kramer, 1996). Even powerful people who are genuinely good and trustworthy are usually less aware of this gap, rating themselves as much better at communicating well and more often than their subordinates rate them in these efforts (Bell, 1996). This research also demonstrates a link between power and trust. Willemyns and colleagues (2003) highlight the importance and implications of this power gap for trusting relations between high- and low-power employees, emphasizing the particular need for those with high power to work harder than their low-power counterparts at building and maintaining trust with others.

The relationship between power and trust is important in understanding the interactions among individuals within organizations. Previous research has highlighted the importance of trust within organizations, and particularly within hierarchical relationships. For instance, Kramer (1996) stated

The importance of trust and the problems that attend it derive at least partially from the reciprocal vulnerabilities and uncertainties that are inherent in hierarchical relationships...characterized by profound and consequential differences in the power, status, dependence, and control that those on top and bottom enjoy. Although these asymmetries create opportunities for jointly beneficial outcomes, they also give rise to the prospect of disappointment and betrayal. (p. 217)

Wells and Kipnis (2001) also discuss the importance of developing trusting relationships between managers and subordinates in organizations and state, as mentioned previously, that despite the importance of the relationship between power and trust, it has not been explored in organizational research. In an effort to explore this gap and better understand

the potential relationship between power and trust, in the next section, I turn to a discussion of what we know about trust that will help explain its relationship to hierarchy and power.

Thus far, I have focused on power, and have painted a largely negative picture of power and its consequences for both power holders and those beneath them. It is true that there can be many benefits of hierarchy within an organization; unfortunately, power often exerts a negative influence on those who possess it and thus negatively influences the potential benefits of an organization's hierarchy (Anderson & Brown, 2010) and taints the perceptions that less powerful people have of those with power. The research that has been examined thus far illustrates why power has been described in the literature as "a dirty word in our culture's lexicon...not considered an appropriate topic for polite conversation...yet...ubiquitous in human social life" (Dépret & Fiske, 1993, p. 176). This negative association that many people have with others' power is crucial to understanding the negative effect that power is predicted to have on an individual's trust of those with power as discussed in the next section.

Trust

Trust has had a similar problem to that discussed above for power in that over the years, it has been difficult for researchers to come to an agreement on how best to define it, prompting the development of a variety of definitions of trust (Bigley & Pearce, 1998; Hosmer, 1995; Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 1998; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998). Common elements of trust that appear in most of these definitions include expectations of others' positive or negative behavior (e.g.,

Solomon, 1960), as well as a willingness to be vulnerable to another (e.g., Mayer et al., 1995). Although, as is the case with power, there is still not an across-the-board consensus on a single definition of trust, the definition I am relying on in this paper is that proposed by Mayer and colleagues (1995) as a “willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other party will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that party” (p. 712). This definition is widely used among trust researchers for studying interpersonal trust between two people.

Trust is also a topic that has been studied in a variety of disciplines and from a variety of perspectives. From a macro organizational perspective, trust has been argued to be a much more effective coordinating mechanism (compared with price and authority) of assets and resources in an emerging knowledge economy, despite the difficulties inherent in the creating and development of trust (Adler, 2001). Adler asserts that the most powerful and beneficial trust for organizations is trust that is built up and accumulated over a long period of time, though that can be difficult to create. Psychologists similarly support the notion that trust is indeed difficult to build, but very easy to lose (e.g., Kramer & Gavrieli, 2004). Despite the difficulty of building trust, it has still been shown to be a distinct and effective mechanism for coordinating social interaction (Bachmann, 2003). This literature has also suggested that, in addition to trust, a separate mechanism for coordinating relationships is power (Bachmann, 2001, 2003).

One of the reasons trust has become so important to study is because of the overall decrease in trust that has been documented recently in organizations and society. For example, Kramer and Lewicki (2010) used recent survey research to highlight what

they refer to as pervasive deficits of trust within organizations. From a national perspective, Twenge, Campbell, and Carter (2014) found similar results using data from national surveys such as that from the U.S. General Social Survey (GSS). They analyzed archival data from the past 40 years of multiple surveys of adults and adolescents (including data from the GSS) and discovered that over the past 4 decades, trust has steadily declined in the U.S. Interestingly, they also found that trust was lowest during times when income inequality was high. Although they do not focus on this latter finding as indicative of an effect of power, it is interesting that during the time when population groups are most differentiated by the amount of money they have (i.e., power, or their control over monetary resources), they report the least amount of trust as well. Together these findings illustrate that people have lower amounts of trust for each other in general, and they also help strengthen the argument that there may be a negative relationship between power and trust. I now turn to focus more specifically on the (lack of) trust that I predict people have for powerful others, and then argue that this relationship can be explained, at least in part, by the unethical expectations people have of those who are powerful.

How Much People Trust the Powerful

Recent trust research has pointed to a renewed importance of better understanding the dynamics of power in the trust literature. In general, Farrell (2004) argued that power asymmetries are likely to affect individuals' trust in each other. Additionally, the recent meta-analysis of Colquitt et al. (2007) highlights the need for future trust and trustworthiness research to pay more attention to differences in power and hierarchy

when studying trust judgments, finding that some antecedents of trust had different effects on trust depending on whether the trustee was a leader- or coworker-based referent. More recently, Robinson et al. (2014) reviewed the impact of coworker deviant behavior in organizations and similarly highlighted the need for future research in this area to pay greater attention to who is engaging in the deviant behavior, questioning the possible effect that high or low power might have on judgments of trust. Thus, a variety of previous research has identified the need for a better understanding of the effect of power on people's judgments of trust, a need that this dissertation helps to address.

A substantial amount of research examining trust within hierarchical relationships has been conducted by Rod Kramer. Kramer has often made the claim that hierarchical relationships are not only prevalent, but among the most important aspects of intraorganizational relationships (Kramer, 1996), and that trust is central to these relationships within organizations (Kramer, 1999) because it allows managers to not have to continually justify their actions to their subordinates (Tyler & DeGoe, 1996) and helps them to avoid the need to monitor employees' performance in microscopic detail. In one of his earlier pieces on this subject, Kramer described people within organizations as intuitive auditors who "monitor the ongoing stream of interactions and exchanges that constitute, quite literally, the give-and-take of a hierarchical relationship, and which provide, in turn, the raw data from which inferences about trust and distrust are forged" (Kramer, 1996, p. 218). It is important to note that these inferences people make from their interactions with others are very idiosyncratic depending on how a particular individual decides to interpret them. Some people tend to have unrealistically positive and optimistic evaluations of events in which they are involved (Taylor & Brown, 1988).

Conversely, others have a tendency to over-attribute hostile or malevolent motives and intentions to others' actions, a tendency referred to as a sinister attribution error (Kramer, 1994; Kramer & Gavrieli, 2004). Regardless of how these interactions are interpreted, Kramer's (1996) argument is that judgments of trust are based on an accumulation of experiences people have with others within their organization.

Trust and distrust can be felt by individuals at both ends of an organization's hierarchical structure. Indeed, trust inherently permeates the relationship between low- and high-power people (Brehm & Gates, 2004). For example, Wells and Kipnis (2001) examined the consequences of trust in terms of influence strategies used when people interact with each other and observed a mutual sense of distrust between both managers and subordinates where both those with high and low power distrusted each other. Highlighting that experiencing distrust and paranoid cognitions are not necessarily limited to those lower in the organizational hierarchy, Kramer and Gavrieli (2004), analyzed tape-recordings of conversations and phone calls of former U.S. president Lyndon B. Johnson and documented a positive association between his feelings of distrust and suspicion and increased vigilance during his presidency. Thus, even though issues of trust within organizations can be reciprocal where those with more power and those with less power trust each other less, I argue that it is more often and likely the case that those with less power will have less trust for those with more power than vice versa.

People differentially process trust-related information depending on the amount of power they have in a hierarchical relationship (Kramer, 1996). Using the relationship between doctoral students (i.e., low power) and their academic advisors (i.e., high power) as an example, Kramer argued that hierarchical relationships inherently involve

“reciprocal vulnerabilities and uncertainties” (1996, p. 217), and found that those in low-power positions were often fearful and suspicious of being manipulated or treated unfairly by those above them in high-power positions. Specifically, the doctoral students exhibited hypervigilance and increased rumination of available information, and were more likely to distrust the other person compared with their academic advisors. They also recognized and remembered more trust-related incidents and engaged in greater cognitive elaboration on these incidents than their high-power partners did. In general, it is possible that less powerful individuals feel uncertain about whether or not those with high power actually support them, or if they are simply focused on their own self-interested ambitions (Kramer, 2001). Indeed, there are a number of possible explanations for these results, but Kramer’s (1996) evidence suggests that since those who are less powerful are generally more likely to notice and recall trust-related aspects of situations and interactions with others, they are thus more likely to develop paranoid cognitions and trust high-powerful others less. Furthermore, Dirks and Skarlicki (2004) cite recent survey evidence indicating that “almost two thirds of employees report having little or no trust in their employers (AFL-CIO 2001)...[and] over 52 percent of employees don’t trust the management of their organization and don’t believe the information they receive (Katcher 2002)” (p. 33).

At the time, Kramer’s (1996) findings (as well as subsequent survey evidence reported by Dirks & Skarlicki, 2004) emphasizing lower amounts of trust among individuals were seemingly contrary to other research that suggested that in general, social perceivers were *more*, rather than less, likely to trust others. Kramer reconciled this inconsistency by arguing that the social situation in his study, (i.e., the organizational

context) is much more conducive to doubts about others' trustworthiness than other non-organizational settings may be. This is similar to a more recent argument made pertaining to behavioral ethics that ethical issues *within the organizational context* may be unique and distinct from other settings in ways which we may not yet understand or appreciate (Brief, 2012). Kramer and Cook (2004) also emphasize the influence of the organization in studying judgments of trust, and they highlight hierarchical relationships as an interesting context within which to study trust judgments. Additionally, they assert that hierarchical differences between individuals in organizations complicate the trust building process, and that the numerous well-known untrustworthy actions that have been committed by organizations, both modern and historical, have combined to not only hurt our confidence in and ability to trust organizations, but in some cases even helped to create a sense of general distrust of organizational authority (Kramer & Cook, 2004). Thus, in order to better understand issues of trust within the organization, researchers need to recognize and take into account the potential unique influences that the organizational context may provide, such as the amount of power another person has within the organization.

Evidence from the political science field has also contributed to an increased understanding of the relationship between power and trust. Some of this research, for example, has shown that it has become the norm in the United States to distrust politicians, individuals whom I argue possess a great deal of power over others, and that over time this lack of trust in political leaders has gradually morphed from being focused on individual politicians into a more general sense of distrust for all authorities in general (Levi & Stoker, 2000). In other research, both Americans (Jennings, 1998) and Japanese

(Pharr, 1997) citizens reported having more confidence in government at the local level than they did in government at the national level. Although they do not talk about these differences in terms of power, I argue that these results have potential important implications for the relationship between power and trust. If we assume that local political authorities, although powerful in their own jurisdiction, are less powerful than national authorities, that means that citizens have lower confidence—which is closely related to trust—in those governmental authorities who are more powerful than they do for those who are less powerful. Although it is possible that these observed differences in trust might be at least partially explained by familiarity—people may be more familiar with local authorities than with national authorities and thus trust them less (c.f., Gefen, 2000; Gulati, 1995)—I argue that it is unlikely that enough people are that much more familiar with local authorities to fully explain these findings. It is interesting, however, that even though these results do not explicitly test the relationship between power and trust, the pattern they exhibit is the same.

An interesting link between the trust literature and power literature pertains to perspective taking. Summarizing arguments made by Pfeffer (1992), Kramer and Gavrieli (2004) state that “the ability to take the perspective of the other party is crucial to success in...cultivating trust” (2004, p. 350). Therefore, perspective taking is an essential aspect of trust formation. Perspective taking has also been linked with a variety of other desirable outcomes such as decreased stereotyping (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000), increased prosocial (vs. self-interested) motivation (Grant & Berry, 2011), attenuation of automatic expression of racial bias (Todd, Bodenhausen, Richeson, & Galinsky, 2011), and it can help facilitate social coordination and the formation of social bonds (Galinsky,

Ku, & Wang, 2005). Unfortunately, those who are in power are also less likely to take the perspective of others (Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2006). Thus, powerful people, who are less likely to take the perspective of another because of their power, are also less likely to cultivate a sense of trust with the people they interact with because of their lack of perspective taking, resulting in powerful people who often may be trusted less by others.

Within organizations, there are many benefits of trust including lower intra- and interorganizational transaction costs, spontaneous sociability, cooperation, and voluntary deference to authority (Kramer, 1999), thus anything within an organization that *decreases* trust can be detrimental in a variety of ways to organizational processes and performance. An increased understanding of those elements—in this case power—that can negatively affect trust can help organizational members guard against and overcome these negative effects to help enjoy the benefits of more trusting relationships throughout the organization. Much of the existing research on trust examines trust based on how it is affected by the interactions an individual has had with others, and/or the behaviors a person observes others engaging in. Although this is often the way trust judgments are made, for the purpose of this dissertation, I examine the effect that power can have on trust, absent any behavioral or relational cues with which to base judgments of trust upon. Instead, I predict that in these types of circumstances, people have negative perceptions of power based on their own personal and vicarious experiences with people in power and the way they perceive powerful people in general to behave. I argue that these negative perceptions of power cause people to have a lower initial level of trust for powerful individuals, even without knowing anything about their personality or behavior,

but simply based on their knowledge that the individual has power. Based on the power literature reviewed that demonstrates that power leads people to be more corrupt (e.g., Kipnis, 1972), more aggressive, unethical, and disinhibited (e.g., Keltner et al., 2003), and less constrained in their behavior (e.g., Overbeck et al., 2006), and on the trust literature that highlights the mutual lack of trust between employees and managers (e.g., Wells & Kipnis, 2001), the propensity for the less powerful to be more attentive to the more powerful (e.g., Kramer, 1996), and the pervasive deficits in trust in organizations in recent years (e.g., Kramer & Lewicki, 2010), I predict that people will be less trusting of a more powerful person than they will be of a less powerful person. Specifically, I hypothesize that

H1: There is a negative relationship between an individual's power and the amount of trust less powerful others have for him/her.

One of the important consequences of people having high power is that others are less likely to trust them. Having laid the groundwork for the association between power and trust, a natural next step is to explore the specific psychological process underlying this lack of trust people have for powerful others. Building on the research outlined above, I argue that it is the expectations that people have of the (un)ethical behavior of powerful people that mediates the relationship between power and trust. I will argue that another's perceived power affects how (un)ethical others expect this person to behave and that these expectations affect how much those other people are willing to trust the powerful individual.

Expectations

In this section I help answer the question “why do people trust high power people less?” and the answer I propose is that low power people have more negative expectations of a powerful person’s behavior. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the word expectation is defined as “the state or condition of expecting or mentally looking for something...the condition of being likely, or entitled, to receive or experience something in the future...the degree of probability of the occurrence of any contingent event...affording ground for favourable anticipations” (OED). A fair amount of expectations research comes from social psychology, which often focuses on the effects of expectations on perceptions and reactions in terms of biases (e.g., confirmation bias, self-fulfilling prophecy) (Eden & Shani, 1982; Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, Frey, & Thelen, 2001; Jussim & Harber, 2005; Nickerson, 1998; Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968) and attribution (Kelley & Michela, 1980; Ross, Lepper, & Ward, 2010; Weiner, 1985). Our expectations of encounters with others typically depend on unique characteristics of the people with whom we interact and/or the situations in which those encounters take place. For example, Hoyle, Pinkley, and Insko (1989) have shown that “people harbor expectations of social interaction that lead them to expect certain behaviors from themselves and others” (p. 366) and that “the mere anticipation of an interaction involving individuals or groups will produce a set of expectations corresponding to the interpersonal or intergroup interaction” (p. 366). They also argue more broadly that “there exist social schemata corresponding to typical behaviors in social encounters” (p. 374). Thus, it is likely that in general, people have *a priori* expectations of their own and others’ behavior in most situations involving social interactions.

The expectations people have of others are also related to the *role* they perceive others to have. According to role theory, people's roles within a given social structure stem from the expectations they hold of their own behaviors as well as the behaviors of others (Biddle, 1986; Fast & Joshi, 2014; Joshi & Fast, 2013). Biddle (1986) asserts that most roles are generated by expectations, and these expectations are learned and formed through people's experiences. Thus, it is individuals' personal experiences, as well as those they experience vicariously through others, that will dictate their expectations in most social situations, and these expectations often stem from the knowledge people have of their position within a social structure (Mechanic, 1962). Related to this is what psychologists have long referred to as the halo effect, which occurs when people's global evaluation of a person influences their (often unconscious) perceptions of that person's other individual attributes (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). To use the role of "boss" as an example, people's previous positive and negative experiences with bosses have likely caused them to develop expectations about what bosses do and how they behave, and these expectations influence their general perceptions of the role of a boss. Thus, their evaluation of anyone in this role will be based on these previously developed expectations.

Since many of our day-to-day social encounters with others take place in the context of an organization, it is important to understand if or how the organizational context might influence the types of expectations we have of others. Indeed, some have argued that because of the stark differences between organizational and non-organizational contexts, people ought to have different expectations of people's behaviors at work compared to their behaviors outside of work (Carr, 1968). Some of the

organizational research focuses on the violation of expectations and how individuals react when situations do not play out the way that they expect (Elangovan & Shapiro, 1998; Kim, Dirks, & Cooper, 2009; Olekalns, Kulik, & Chew, 2014; Robinson, 1996; Tost, 2011). Other research has argued more generally that individuals' expectations affect how they construct meaning of events that happen at work (Sonenshein, 2007). Overall, this research illustrates that people's expectations do influence their perceptions and behaviors within organizations.

Power, Trust, and Expectations of Un(Ethical) Behavior

Expectations People Have of the Powerful

Since power within organizations is typically unevenly distributed among organizational members, I argue that the amount of power individuals are perceived to have can affect how they are expected to behave. Indeed, Egan and Hirt (2015) have recently demonstrated an empirical relationship between power and expectancies—specifically finding that expectancies affected the executive functioning consequences of power—and they point out that “although there has been extensive inquiry into the influence of both individual and situational factors in the operation of interpersonal power, little work has focused upon the role of expectancies in power's downstream consequences” (p. 347). Their findings support the notion that downstream consequences (i.e., effects) of power are in fact influenced by expectations.

Both those at the top and bottom of an organization's hierarchy are likely to develop expectations of each other. Georgesen and Harris (2006) discovered that when those with power had negative expectations of their subordinates, they rated the

performance of their subordinates and their experience working with them much more negatively than when they had positive expectations. From the subordinates' perspective, these authors found that subordinates were often somehow able to recognize the negative expectations of their bosses (Georgesén & Harris, 2006) and were able to attempt behavioral *disconfirmation* after detecting negative expectancies (Georgesén & Harris, 2000). Perceivers also have different expectations of others' behavior depending on how powerful others are perceived to be. For instance, Fragale et al. (2011) presented people with a description of an individual who had high or low amounts of power and status and then asked them to imagine interacting with this person and predict what that interaction would be like. They found that people have the most positive expectations for interactions with others who have low power but high status, and the most negative expectations for interactions with those who have high power but low status. These expectations were measured as coders rated participants' narratives of the badness or goodness of interacting with the person in terms of being accommodating, not coercive, appropriate for the situation, and putting the participants' needs first. Other research has argued that perceivers expect that the behavior of powerful individuals is motivated by feelings of self-interest and a desire to exploit others (Overbeck et al., 2006). Thus, the more power people possess, the more they are expected to have negative motives and engage in negative behaviors, supporting the argument that there is a relationship between power and expectations.

Behavioral Expectations and Trust in Others

In the language of the trust literature, in this dissertation, I am studying how the trustor's perception of the trustee's power affects the trustor's judgments of trust in the trustee. The three elements of perceived trustworthiness of a trustee—their ability, benevolence, and integrity—are all unique antecedents to judgments of trust (Colquitt et al., 2007; Mayer et al., 1995). In their meta-analysis, Colquitt and colleagues (2007) found that each one of these three components of trustworthiness provides a unique and distinct pathway for developing trust in another person. They also tested to see whether or not these relationships would change based on whether the trustee was a leader or a coworker and found that in general, these relationships did not change across referents, with the one exception of integrity, which had stronger positive correlations with trust for leader-based referents than for coworker-based referents. They concluded that there is something unique about the relationship between integrity and trust that is different from the relationships between benevolence or ability and trust.

Though many of the Colquitt et al. (2007) meta-analytic findings are pertinent to the relationships I propose in this dissertation, there are some important differences between their findings and the current research that help to illustrate the importance, and the potential theoretical and empirical contributions, of the current research. First, Colquitt and colleagues examined how the difference in power between two parties moderated the relationship between trust and its antecedents and consequences. I examine the difference in power as an independent variable and propose that it has a direct effect on behavioral expectations and trust. Second, their results are cross-sectional and correlational and prevent causal claims being made. Third, they defined integrity as “the

extent to which a trustee is believed to adhere to sound moral and ethical principles” (p. 910), and based on their interpretation of this definition, they included variables that included credibility, promise keeping, and procedural justice. Although this is consistent with scales used to measure integrity as a component of trustworthiness (i.e., Mayer & Davis, 1999), in the following section, I instead focus much more specifically on expectations of ethical behavior, without the potentially confounding influence of the other variables that they identified as integrity, and highlight the arguably unique relationship that these expectations of others’ ethical behavior have with power and trust. Although there are many similarities between these other variables identified as integrity, such as between procedural justice and ethical behavior—indeed ethicality is one of the criteria of procedural justice (Leventhal, 1980)—there are also important differences between them, especially pertaining to people’s perceptions of others (Soderberg, Rees, Diekmann, & Sondak, 2016), thus illustrating the need to be more specific. Finally, Colquitt and colleagues (2007) point out that their results are largely based on studies that examined trust judgments based on the behaviors of a leader or coworker referent. However, as mentioned previously, I am arguing that power can have an effect on judgments of trust without any interaction with or any awareness of the behaviors of a powerful person.

In line with previous predictions about the antecedents of trust, Farrell (2004) argued that asymmetries of power between two people are likely to have an effect on trust. Additionally, Kramer (1996) claimed that “individuals’ judgments about others’ trustworthiness are anchored, at least in part, on their a priori expectations about others’ behavior and the extent to which subsequent experience supports or discredits those

expectations” (p. 219). In other words, expectations are an important component of perceived trustworthiness. As the findings of Colquitt et al. (2007) indicated, integrity was the only dimension of trustworthiness that was different within relationships where there was an obvious difference in power between the two parties. Thus, it is appropriate to examine expectations of a high-power person’s integrity in order to better understand the relationship between this person’s power and how much they are trusted by less powerful others.

Expectations of Powerful People Engaging in (Un)Ethical Behavior

There are a variety of qualities associated with integrity, such as fairness, reliability, keeping promises, and ethicality (Colquitt et al., 2007). In this dissertation, I will focus specifically on ethicality and argue that a trustor’s expectations that a trustee will engage in ethical behavior is an important mechanism for explaining the relationship between power and trust. Focusing on expectations of (un)ethical behavior is also important because it helps distinguish these expectations from other similar expectations that people might also have of others’ behavior. Indeed, as Colquitt et al. (2007) state, each of the three elements of trustworthiness—ability, benevolence, and integrity—have a unique and distinct relationship with trust, a finding which I will attempt to replicate to justify the focus on only one of these elements in this dissertation. Thus, expectations of (un)ethical behavior (i.e., integrity) would be predicted to have a unique, but different, effect on trust than would expectations of benevolence or of a person’s abilities.

Keltner and colleagues (2003) proposed that those with power are more likely to behave in socially inappropriate ways. Assuming unethical behavior is often considered

to be inappropriate, an assumption consistent with Treviño and Brown (2005), subsequent research has confirmed this proposition. For example, Lammers, Stapel, and Galinsky (2010) found that those with power not only hypocritically condemn others' unethical behavior more than their own, but also engage in more unethical behavior themselves. Additionally, an increased focus on rewards explained why those with higher power in ultimatum bargaining games behaved more unethically when the potential profits were highest (Boles, Croson, & Murnighan, 2000). As mentioned earlier, a sense of power can drive one's tendency to behave unethically (Dubois et al., 2015), and even Hollander's (1958) research about idiosyncrasy credits argues that those who have become powerful have acquired permission to deviate from normative behavior, which may include unethical behavior. Both field and experimental studies have shown that those who are higher in the hierarchy, and thus assumed to have more power, are also more likely to engage in unethical behavior (Edelman & Larkin, 2014). Thus, those who are powerful are more likely than less powerful others to engage in unethical behavior, and by extension, less powerful perceivers would be more likely to expect unethical behavior from them.

Real-world examples of powerful people behaving in unethical ways are plentiful. Whether it is a chief financial officer lying to authorities (Schencker, 2014), a chief executive officer lying on his resume (Pepitone, 2012), or a president making false claims (Holan, 2013), these stories and many more like them share the common theme of powerful people in "high-level" positions engaging in unethical behavior. Even if these transgressions seem to be more prevalent simply because the actions of powerful people are more visible than those of less powerful people, I argue that the actions that are the

most visible have a much greater chance of impacting people's expectations. Thus, research and real-life examples both contribute to the established association between power and unethical behavior. This is especially important because these real-life examples exemplify the types of experiences individuals hear about and have in organizations on a regular basis, and since experiences lead to expectations, these experiences ultimately result in people developing expectations that high-power people will engage in unethical behavior.

Research in the marketing literature has also discussed "ethical expectations," defined as people's predictions about the extent to which they believe an organization will behave in an ethical manner (Ingram, Skinner, & Taylor, 2005). In this research, consumers' develop ethical expectations of organizations from 1) customers' direct experience with the organization, 2) word of mouth communication, and 3) information from secondary sources. Although this research focuses on people's ethical expectations of organizations based on their own and others' experiences with these companies, I argue that these same mechanisms influence people's expectations of other people as well. Indeed, people's expectations stem from their experiences (Biddle, 1986), and I argue that people also develop more specific "ethical expectations" of others based on their previous experiences with them or with others who are similar to them engaging in (un)ethical behavior. Thus, as the focus in this dissertation is people's ethical expectations of those who are powerful, any experience people have personally had—or that they have become aware of—with high-powerful people engaging in (un)ethical behavior will likely influence their behavioral expectations of future interactions with others who are similarly powerful.

Unfortunately, the experience of personally witnessing powerful people engage in unethical behavior is quite common within organizations. A recent survey of nearly 6,500 U.S. employees in the for-profit sector (i.e., the National Business Ethics Survey®) found that the majority (60%) of workplace misconduct is committed by managers (i.e., those in positions of power), and that more senior leaders are more likely to engage in unethical behavior than lower level managers (Ethics Resource Center, 2013). This regularly conducted nationwide survey provides a snapshot of the current state of ethical behavior in organizations within the U.S., and has been referenced frequently in prior organizational research (e.g., Christensen, Peirce, Hartman, Hoffman, & Carrier, 2007; Greenberg, 2002; Kaptein & Schwartz, 2008; Kish-Gephart, Harrison, & Treviño, 2010; Schwartz, 2001; Smith-Crowe & Warren, 2014; Treviño & Brown, 2004). According to the Ethics Resource Center (2013), “for the first time...[they] not only looked at observation rates, but also delved into the nature of observed misconduct: who commits the misdeeds, how frequently they occur, and the breadth of the problem” (p. 20). This allowed them to get a clearer picture of who is engaging in unethical behavior within organizations, from the perspective of both managerial figures and nonmanagement employees. Additionally, this survey revealed that the top two instances of workplace misconduct were 1) abusive behavior, of which more than 20% of instances were attributed to people in positions of power, and 2) lying to employees, which originates from those in positions of power. Other example items that were used to define observed misconduct or unethical behavior included “violating company policies related to Internet use,” “lying to customers, vendors, or the public,” “discriminating against employees,” “a conflict of interest – that is, behavior that places an employee’s interests over the

company's interests," and "delivery of substandard goods or services." By asking both more and less powerful organizational members about the same set of behaviors, this helps to minimize the potential that some of them may simply have different perceptions of what is or is not ethical. Furthermore, researchers determined that these data were not simply due to employees' general frustration with management, but were indicative of actual behaviors of those managers and senior leaders. Although these data do not speak to individuals' expectations of those in positions of power, they suggest that there may be more unethical behavior reportedly committed by those in positions of power within the organization compared to those in less powerful positions. Thus, people develop these ethical expectations of those around them, and due to the reasons articulated above, oftentimes people expect that those with power will behave in an unethical manner.

As much of the trust literature highlighted previously indicated, once people develop expectations of another's behavior, these expectations constitute an important aspect of a person's willingness to trust another (Balliet & Van Lange, 2013; Colquitt et al., 2007; Farrell, 2004; Lewicki et al., 1998; Lewicki & Stevenson, 1997; Mayer et al., 1995; Rousseau et al., 1998; Solomon, 1960). As Kramer (1999) articulated, trust within organizations is largely about the expectations people have regarding the other members of the organization. When people have more positive expectations of another's behavior, they are predicted to trust them more compared to when they have more negative expectations of another's behavior, wherein they are predicted to trust less. In this dissertation, I argue that people have tendencies to trust those in power less because they expect these people to engage in unethical behavior more. In other words, I predict that expectations of (un)ethical behavior mediate the relationship between power and trust.

The overall model that I have outlined predicts causal relationships between perceived power, behavioral expectations, and judgments of trust. Based on these theoretical arguments, I specifically predict that the reason power has the predicted negative effect on others' trust is because it causes others to develop increased expectations of unethical behavior for those holding positions of power. Accordingly, I hypothesize that

H2: The negative relationship between an individual's power and the amount of trust others have for him/her is mediated by others' expectations of that individual's unethical behavior, such that the more power he/she has, the more others will expect him/her to engage in unethical behavior, and the less they will trust him/her.

The more power an individual has, the more others will expect that powerful person to engage in unethical behavior, and the less others will trust this person. As is arguably true for any organizational phenomenon, the relationships I have predicted are not likely to occur 100% of the time. Organizations are rife with unique compositions of situational factors, individual differences, and moderating influences that can influence even the most robust of findings. I turn now to a discussion of one likely moderating factor that has the potential to affect the relationships I have outlined thus far, and that factor is an individual's perceived status.

Moderating Role of Status

As two fundamental elements of hierarchy, power and status are terms that have often been used interchangeably in previous research (Aguinis, Simonsen, & Pierce, 1998; Fast & Joshi, 2014; Fiske & Berdahl, 2007; Johnson & Allen, 1972). Although

sociological literature has been debating the separability and distinctiveness of these two constructs for decades (Johnson & Allen, 1972), research in psychology and social psychology has recently begun coalescing around an emerging theoretical and empirical distinction between them (Fragale et al., 2011; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Indeed, status, originally a sociological construct, has often been discussed and defined in previous sociological research very similar to what I in this dissertation refer to as hierarchy, or a rank-ordering, and it has commonly been treated by macro-organizational scholars as an organization-level construct (Johnson & Allen, 1972; Podolny, 1993; Podolny, Stuart, & Hannan, 1996). However, instead of examining status at a more macro/organizational level as much of the sociological literature has done, I will focus on status at the individual level in terms of one person's status among a group of other people.

At the individual level, research has begun to treat status as a unique construct, distinct from power, although this theoretical distinction between power and status can still sometimes be a bit “fuzzy at the edges” (Fiske, 2010, p. 942). Consistent with recent social psychological literature that attempts to differentiate power from status, I adopt the definition of social status offered by Magee and Galinsky (2008), that social status is “the extent to which an individual or group is respected or admired by others” (p. 359). Other definitions typically convey the same general idea using different but similar wording such as prestige (Blader & Chen, 2014; Lount & Pettit, 2012), prominence (Anderson, John, Keltner, & Kring, 2001; Bendersky & Shah, 2013), or recognition and importance (Fiske, 2010). In adopting this definition of social status, I acknowledge that it is somewhat unique compared with other definitions of status used in the social sciences. For example, in the sociological literature, status has been defined as the position that a

person occupies (Henslin, 2013), a socially defined position within a group (Bacharach, Bamberger, & Mundell, 1993), and as a characterization of one's position within a social network (Podolny et al., 1996). Furthermore, social status is often subdivided into achieved and/or ascribed status (Linton, 1936), illustrating that status can be both inherited as well as earned. Even within psychological research, the term social status has been used interchangeably with socioeconomic status (Adler, Epel, Castellazzo, & Ickovics, 2000) and social class (Piff, Stancato, Côté, Mendoza-Denton, & Keltner, 2012), making it difficult to define subjective social status in a consistent and precise manner while maintaining its distinction from power. I have chosen to adopt Magee and Galinsky's (2008) definition of social status because of its fit with much of the social psychological literature that I am drawing upon and speaking to in this dissertation.

Based on this definition of status, and its distinction from power, people's status tells more about what others actually think of them, while their power is more of a non-personal characteristic that they simply possess. Indeed, previous research has characterized status as emanating from subjective and consensual processes, whereas power exists as a more objective control of resources (Fragale et al., 2011; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Further outlining the theoretical distinction between these two forms of influence, Magee and Galinsky (2008) stated that "power, more than status, therefore, is a property of the actor. Status, more than power, is a property of co-actors and observers" (p. 364). Observers, especially subordinates, generally have little or no control over the amount of power another person has and rarely get to choose who has power over them; however, they do have a great deal of control over the amount of respect and admiration they are willing to bestow upon others as this is a voluntary process that depends on their

perceptions of the powerful person (Fragale et al., 2011).

A variety of factors, such as expectancy and behavioral confirmation (Magee & Galinsky, 2008) and stereotypes (Cohen & Zhou, 1991) can influence which and when individuals are granted status by others. Similarly, others have argued more generally that people bestow status upon others “because of [others’] desirable attributes and skills (Blau, 1964; Van Vugt et al., 2008)” (Fragale et al., 2011, p. 768), and that an individual’s social status serves as a measure of that person’s social worth in the eyes of others (Chen, Peterson, Phillips, Podolny, & Ridgeway, 2012). Although both those who are powerful and those who have high status desire to maintain their high levels of power (Kipnis, 1972) and status (Blader & Chen, 2011), power has been argued to cause people to ignore many of the relational dynamics of their interactions with others, while status often has a tendency to draw people’s attention to other social targets around them and to be concerned with the impressions other people have of them (Blader & Chen, 2012; Flynn, Reagans, Amanatullah, & Ames, 2006). Thus, I argue that people expect high-status others to continue engaging in the same type of worthy and desirable behaviors that helped them to achieve their high status in the first place, whereas people develop greater expectations that those who have power over them are more likely to discount or ignore interpersonal relations in the pursuit of their overarching goals.

Despite this theoretical distinction between power and status, researchers have increasingly emphasized the importance of recognizing the difference between these two variables (Blader & Chen, 2014), and especially the need to make a more empirical distinction between their main and interactive effects (Fast & Joshi, 2014). Though there is relatively little social psychological or organizational research that has made such a

distinction at the individual level, the findings of those studies that have done so are remarkably consistent, showing that power generally results in more negative effects and status generally results in more positive effects. Although power and status differences in general influence people's perceptions (e.g., expectations) (Cook et al., 2004), experimental studies have shown that they both can exhibit distinct and unique effects on these perceptions that help give a more nuanced understanding of their impact in social situations. As with the earlier discussion about power, I will first discuss the effect of status on the status holder, then move to a discussion of status from the perspective of a perceiver/observer.

Blader and Chen (2012), whose research on power and fairness was discussed earlier, also found that status had the opposite effect of power and actually caused people to behave more, rather than less fairly. They also showed that there was an interaction between power and status on the enactment of justice towards others, such that when a person had high status and low power, there was a positive effect of status on fair behavior, but when a person had high status and high power, there was a negative effect on fair behavior. Fast, Halevy, and Galinsky (2012) also demonstrated an interaction between power and status. They focused on the specific instance when an actor has high power and low status and illustrated that people in this condition—more so than in any other condition of high or low power and status—were more demeaning of others. Further emphasizing that high status is associated with “positive” outcomes, additional research has demonstrated that those with high status increase their generosity towards their group (Willer, 2009) and have a tendency to trust others more and expect that others have more positive intentions towards them (Lount & Pettit, 2012). Even though it is

from the perspective of the high status person as opposed to a perceiver, this connection that Lount and Pettit make between high status and increased trust also supports the idea the status may have a more positive relationship than power on a person's trust. Other research has also shown the differential relationship that power and status can have with perspective taking. Blader and Chen (2014) reported the results of an unpublished manuscript that found that those who had high status were more likely to engage in perspective taking than those who either had low status or were in a control condition (Blader, Shirako, & Chen, 2016). Individuals with high status thus engage in many more positive, observable behaviors that in most studies are opposite of the behaviors that those with high power are prone to engage in. Since expectations reinforce status hierarchies, and having high status generates more positive behavioral expectations (Magee & Galinsky, 2008), I argue that people expect that those with high status will continue to engage in the same types of positive behaviors that caused them to achieve high status in the first place.

Moving to the perspective of a perceiver, the work of Fragale and colleagues (2011) is also relevant to perceptions of status. Earlier, I highlighted their findings pertaining to an individual's perceived power, but an additional finding from their research indicated that power and status interact to affect individuals' expectations of interaction quality with another person (i.e., whether they predicted that the interaction would be positive or negative). Specifically, participants reported their expectations of interacting with another individual who was 1) high in status and low in power, 2) high in status and high in power, 3) low in status and low in power, or 4) low in status and high in power, and they had significantly different expectations for interacting with a person in

each of these four potential conditions. In order from the most positive to least positive expectations, the most positive expected interaction was with the high-status, low-power person, followed by the high-status, high-power person, next was with the low-status, low-power person, and the least positive expectations were with the low-status, high-power person. Thus, Fragale et al. (2011), Blader and Chen (2012), and Fast et al. (2012) all found similar significant interactions between power and status on a target's actual behavior and on perceivers' perceptions and behavioral expectations of the target. Each of these studies illustrate similar main effects of power and status on different dependent variables, where increased power generally led to more negative results (i.e., less positive expectations, less justice toward others) and increased status generally led to more positive results (i.e., more positive expectations, more justice toward others), and similar interaction effects where status moderated the effects of power.

Although these findings help identify the unique and interactive effects of power and status in a variety of ways, it is also important to recognize that power and status can also be related to and reinforcing of one another (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Especially within real organizations, it is possible that people do not always view authorities with such a nuanced view that separates their perceived status of the authority figure from that figure's perceived power. In a hierarchical sense, some people may simply see "the boss" as a powerful figure who also has high status without thinking about or recognizing the distinction between them. This presents a significant obstacle to better understanding the relevance of this research within an organizational context. Indeed, all of the studies discussed above showing an interaction between power and status were experimental studies where the variables of power and status were manipulated by researchers. In

practice, employees may not necessarily think of their authorities explicitly in terms of power and status differences and empirically, these variables may be correlated. Thus, one of the goals of this dissertation is to demonstrate the separability of these two variables, especially within actual organizations, and to show that, despite their similarities, people do recognize the differences between power and status, and have different evaluations of and attitudes towards powerful figures—who have control over resources—based on how much respect and admiration they personally have for these individuals.

Going one step further with regard to individuals' behavioral responses, Willer (2009) showed that people were more willing to cooperate with those who had high status compared to those who did not. Based on the previous research findings, I argue that this increased willingness to cooperate stems from and contributes to future expectations that the high status person will continue to engage in positive behaviors. Thus, the perceptions and expectations perceivers have of those with high status are very positive, and in most cases completely opposite to the perceptions they have of those with high power.

In general, the research findings on status indicate that those actors with status engage in more positive behaviors and are perceived and expected to behave more positively by others. This is in stark contrast to the findings on power where findings illustrated generally more negative behaviors from, and more negative perceptions and behavioral expectations of, those with power. Fast and Joshi (2014) discuss the importance of finding potential moderators to shield against the generally negative effects of power, and one variable that they specifically highlight as a potential moderator is status. Based on the theorized and demonstrated differences between power and status

and the ways they have been shown to interact, I argue that status will have a moderating influence on power's negative effect on expectations of ethical behavior. Specifically, I hypothesize that

H3: An individual's perceived status will moderate the strength of the relationship between his/her perceived power and others' expectations of his/her unethical behavior, such that this relationship will be weaker when the individual is perceived to have high status than when he/she is perceived to have low status.

Herein I have argued that the more power people perceive a person to have, the more they expect that person to engage in unethical behavior, and the less trust they have in that person. I have also argued that a person's perceived status interacts with the amount of power the person is perceived to have, such that the more they perceive that person to have high status, the more they expect that person to behave ethically (see Figure 1). Formally predicting this moderated mediation model, I hypothesize that

H4: An individual's perceived status will moderate the strength of the mediated relationship between his/her perceived power with the amount of trust others have for him/her via others' expectations of his/her ethical behavior, such that the mediated relationship will be weaker when the individual is perceived to have high status than when he/she is perceived to have low status.

Assuming this model to be true, there are important implications for organizational life. If members of the organization are inclined to have less trust for powerful organizational figures, those in positions of power have to work much harder to overcome this initial




Figure 1: *The hypothesized relationships between an individual's power and status, and another's behavioral expectations and trust of that individual*

lack of trust by demonstrating their trustworthiness to those with less power beneath them. Since people's expectations are based on their own experiences, which admittedly are biased and subjective, organizational authorities need to help create positive experiences for their less powerful employees to help create more positive behavioral expectations, with an ultimate goal of eventually instilling a greater sense of trust in their employees. Also, managers can focus on engaging in behaviors that will lead to them having a greater amount of status, behaviors that members of their organization will value and appreciate. In the next section, I describe the studies I have conducted to test these hypotheses and this model.

CHAPTER 2

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

To examine the hypotheses described in Chapter 1, I develop five different studies that examine the relationships of power, trust, expectations, and status in a variety of contexts and with three different populations. Studies 1, 2a, and 2b each employ the same experimental paradigm to test Hypotheses 1 and 2, using either multiple samples of U.S. adults recruited online or a sample of undergraduate college students. In Study 3, I examine the complete moderated mediation model, testing all four hypotheses, using a different experimental paradigm and with a different sample of U.S. adults recruited online. Study 4 also tests all four hypotheses in the full model using a sample of working professionals enrolled in an evening professional MBA program.

Study 1: Trust of Those With Power

The purpose of this first study was to test Hypothesis 1, which predicts a negative relationship between an individual's power and others' trust in this individual. Using a bargaining game that has been shown to successfully manipulate participants' perceptions of another person's power (van Dijk, De Cremer, & Handgraaf, 2004), I examined how the amount of power a person has affects how much he/she is trusted by participants.

Participants

Based on an a priori power analysis with a desired power level of .80, an alpha error probability of .05, and an effect size estimate of .20, I recruited a total of 203

participants from Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an online marketplace where human intelligence tasks can be completed online by individuals in exchange for monetary compensation. Research has shown that MTurk samples are often more diverse than typical American college student samples and that data obtained from them are just as reliable as data obtained using other more traditional methods (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). Indeed, the use of MTurk participants is becoming more prevalent in top tier journals in both management and psychology. These participants received \$.50 for participating in the study, and it took them on average just under 11 minutes to complete the study. Of the initial sample of 203, there were 5 participants who did not correctly answer the attention check question and their responses were subsequently removed from further analysis. Of the remaining 198 participants, their average age was 38.72 ($SD = 12.98$), and 52% were female. All participants were adults from the U.S. and 85% reported their ethnicity as White, 6% as Black, 5% as Asian, 2% as Hispanic, and 2% as other. They had on average 12.87 years ($SD = 11.93$) of full-time work experience and 73% reported being currently employed. Nineteen percent held an advanced, post-graduate degree, 3% had some postgraduate experience, 39% had a bachelor's degree, and 26% had at least some college experience.

Design and Procedure

After consenting to participate in the study, participants learned that they would be playing a hypothetical decision-making game in which there were two roles, the allocator and the recipient, and that they would be assigned to one of these roles. Before being assigned a role, all participants read the instructions of the game and

responsibilities for each role. These instructions described that the allocator receives 100 chips to begin and has to make a proposal for how to divide the chips—each chip having a certain unspecified value—between themselves and the recipient. This proposal would be sent to the recipient who would then be responsible for deciding whether to accept or reject the proposal. Participants read that if they decided to accept the proposal, the chips would be divided exactly as proposed by the allocator, ending the game. Following van Dijk et al. (2004), I manipulated power based on what happened if the participant decided to reject the proposal, and there were two possible conditions to which all participants were randomly assigned. In the first condition, a rejection meant that neither the allocator nor the recipient would receive any chips at all, ending the game (i.e., proposal multiplied by 0); in the second condition, a rejection would reduce the proposal by 10% and the reduced number of chips would then be allocated to both players, ending the game (i.e., proposal multiplied by 0.9) (see Appendix A to see the full wording of the instructions in this study). In the first condition, participants read the following, emphasizing the equality of power between both roles,

As you can see, in this game the allocator and the recipient have equal amounts of control: the allocator has complete control over the decision for proposing how to allocate the chips; the recipient has complete control over whether or not the allocation will actually occur.

In the second condition, participants read the following, emphasizing that the allocator role has more power,

As you can see, in this game the allocator has a lot more control than the recipient: the allocator has complete control over the decision for proposing how to allocate the chips; the recipient is only able to reduce the allocator's proposal by 10%.

After answering questions to ensure they understood the most important elements

of the game, all participants were assigned to play the role of recipient, and were asked how much they trusted the allocator before receiving the actual proposal. They then received the details of the proposal, indicating that it was proposed for the allocator to receive 60 chips and the participant to receive 40 chips, after which they had to decide whether to accept or reject the proposal. Finally, participants completed individual difference and demographic measures to finish the survey. Although participants did end up making a final decision of whether to accept or reject the proposal, I was not interested in their behavioral response to the proposal for this dissertation, but rather the judgment of trust prior to receiving the actual proposal. However, these decisions were made to help increase the realism of the exercise for participants.

Measures

Trust. Consistent with previous trust research (e.g., Maddux, Mullen, & Galinsky, 2008; Schweitzer, Hershey, & Bradlow, 2006), participants completed a single-item measure of trust by responding to the question “How much do you trust the allocator during this exercise?” with responses ranging from 1 (do not trust at all) to 7 (completely trust).¹

Results

Manipulation check. To determine whether participants recognized the difference or similarity in the amount of power of the allocator, each participant answered the question “Which player has the most control in this decision game?” with possible

¹ In studies 1, 2b, 3, and 4, I also measured trust using an adapted version of the 4-item scale of Mayer and Davis (1999). I did not use this measure because the scale was not consistently reliable across studies; however, scale items and reliability measures are reported in Appendix B.

responses being 1 (allocator), 2 (recipient), or 3 (neither, both the allocator and recipient have the same amount of control). A chi-square analysis showed that the manipulation of power was successful, $\chi^2 = 124.63$, $p < .001$, Cramer's $V = .78$, and that participants correctly recognized when the allocator was either more powerful than they were, or had the same amount of power as they did.

Study results. Dummy codes were used to create a power variable (1 = more power, 0 = equal power) describing the amount of power of the allocator compared to the recipient. Means, standard deviations, and the correlation between power and trust are listed in Table 1. To test Hypothesis 1—that there is a negative relationship between a person's power and how much they are trusted by others—I conducted a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) where the independent variable was the power of the allocator and the dependent variable was the single-item measure of how much participants reported they trusted the allocator. Participants reported having less trust ($M = 3.42$, $SD = 1.38$) for the allocator with more power than for the allocator who had the same amount of power ($M = 3.86$, $SD = 1.45$), $F(1, 197) = 4.74$, $p = .031$, $\eta^2 = .02$. These results support Hypothesis 1 by demonstrating that, even without interacting with the allocator, participants had less trust for allocators who were more powerful than they did for those who were described as being equally powerful (see Figure 2).

Discussion

Overall, results from Study 1 support Hypothesis 1 by demonstrating that people were less trusting of others who had more power over them than they were of others who had the same amount of power as they did. In Studies 2b, 3, and 4, I will test for this

Table 1: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations

	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	(1)	(2)
(1) Individual's Power	.49	.50	—	
(2) Trust	3.65	1.43	-.15*	—

Note. $N = 198$. Individual's Power is coded equal = 0, more = 1.

* $p < .05$




Figure 2: The amount of trust participants reported having for allocators when allocators were either more powerful or had the same amount of power as participants.

effect of power on trust in an effort to replicate these results in other populations and by manipulating and measuring these variables in different ways. In the next two studies, I examine the role of (un)ethical expectations to help explain this trust deficit.

Study 2a: The Effect of Power on Others' Expectations

In this study, I focus on the relationship between the amount of power a person has and others' expectations that the person will engage in (un)ethical behavior. Since expectations of others' (un)ethical behavior is the proposed mechanism to explain how power can affect trust (the relationship examined in Study 1), this study tests the first link in the mediation model between the independent variable (i.e., power) and the proposed mediating variable (i.e., expectations). In this study, I examine this relationship using the same bargaining game used in Study 1, but adapted so that the allocator had an opportunity to engage in unethical behavior.

Participants

Based on a power analysis with a desired power level of .80, an alpha error probability of .05, and an effect size estimate of .19, I recruited 229 participants through MTurk, as described in Study 1. Participants were paid \$.50 for their participation and averaged just over 11 minutes to complete the study. Although all participants were U.S. adults—the same general population as recruited from in Study 1—this sample is a completely different set of participants than the sample used in the previous study. There were a total of 10 participants from this sample who did not correctly answer the attention check question and their responses were subsequently removed from further analysis. Of the remaining 219 participants, their average age was 37.89 ($SD = 12.99$),

and 47% were female. Seventy-four percent reported their ethnicity as White, 12% as Black, 5% as Hispanic, 5% as Asian, and 4% as other. They averaged 12.63 years ($SD = 11.95$) of full-time work experience and 76% were currently employed. Twelve percent had some kind of a postgraduate degree, 2% had some postgraduate experience, 34% had a bachelor's degree, and 41% had some college experience.

Design and Procedure

The same hypothetical bargaining game used in Study 1 was used in this study to manipulate power, providing one condition where the participant had the same amount of power as the allocator, and another where the allocator had more power than the participant. However, since the purpose of this study was to test how power could affect participants' expectations that a person will engage in unethical behavior, there was an addition made to the design and procedure described in Study 1 to allow for the allocator to have the potential to engage in unethical behavior.

In this study, it was important to create a situation where the allocator would have the potential to lie in order to test whether—and how much—participants expected the allocator to take advantage of the opportunity and actually engage in unethical behavior during the exercise. This adaptation was modeled after the Asymmetric Information procedure used by van Dijk and colleagues (2004), which balances participants' desire to appear fair (Pillutla & Murnighan, 2003; Straub & Murnighan, 1995) with self-interested tendencies (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986; Pillutla & Murnighan, 2003). After participants read through the responsibilities of allocators and recipients, there was an additional set of instructions that described two different versions of the bargaining game,

but told them that they would only be playing one of these two versions. In the first version, the chips the allocator received to begin the game were worth the same amount to both the allocator and the recipient, but in the second version, chips were worth twice as much to the allocator than they were to the recipient. Examples were provided to illustrate that in the first version, 50 chips were equal to 50 points for both players, but in the second version, 50 chips were equal to 50 points for the recipient but were worth double that amount—100 points—for the allocator. All participants then read that only the allocator would know which version of the game was being played and would thus be able to take this information into account when making a proposal to the recipient.

Participants were then informed that even though recipients would not be officially told which version they were playing, the allocator would be asked to send a message to the recipient, at the time the proposal was submitted, to tell the recipient which version was being played. However, it was made explicit that it would be possible for an allocator to lie when sending the message since there was no way for recipients to verify whether the allocator was telling the truth or not, nor was there any mechanism in place for allocators who lied to be punished for giving wrong information. Thus, all participants were aware that when recipients received the message from the allocator, that message may not be accurate (see Appendix C for complete wording of instructions). Before being assigned to their role, all participants answered a number of questions to ensure they understood the details of the game and of each role.

In either version, if recipients know which version is being played, it is clear how many points both players end up with, and it is easy for them to determine the fairness of the proposal. However, this is not the case if they do not know which version is being

played. For example, if an allocator was to propose an even 50/50 split, there is an incentive for the allocator to have recipients think that version one is being played. This is because the chips are equally divided and appear to be fairly split, but allocators earn double the points. If recipients are aware of the point differential, it is much more likely that they will reject the proposal because they would receive fewer points. Otherwise, allocators can use the information asymmetry to their advantage and have an easier chance of making a proposal that recipients will be more likely to accept while still achieving the most possible points for themselves (i.e., strategic use of fairness; van Dijk et al., 2004). Ultimately, if a recipient does not know which version is being played, it gives allocators a chance to lie about which version is actually being played in order to make their proposals appear fairer than they actually are and for them to acquire more points for themselves.

Once participants correctly answered the questions, they were assigned to the role of recipient and randomly assigned to one of the two power conditions. At this point, participants answered questions about how much they expected the allocator to engage in unethical behavior. They then received a proposal for the allocator to keep 60 chips and for the participant to receive 40 chips and decided whether to accept or reject this proposal. Participants then completed individual difference measures and provided demographic information before finishing the survey.

Measures

Expectations of unethical behavior. To assess the extent to which participants expected the allocator to engage in unethical behavior (adapted from Tenbrunsel, 1998),

participants were asked “What is the probability that the allocator would engage in unethical behavior (by lying when sending the message) in this exercise?” To respond to this question, participants were presented with a slider scale with values ranging from 0 to 100. Multiples of 10 were labeled in between these extremes (e.g., 10, 20, 30), but any positive integer between and including 0 and 100 could be selected. As participants dragged the slider, the number associated with the position indicated by the slider appeared so that they could easily select the desired number.

Results

Manipulation check. The same procedure that was used in Study 1 to test the power manipulation was also used in this study. A chi-square analysis indicated that manipulation of power was indeed successful, $\chi^2 = 96.22$, $p < .001$, Cramer’s $V = .66$, and that participants correctly recognized when the allocator was either more powerful or had the same amount of power as they did.

Study results. Means, standard deviations, and the correlation between power and expectations of unethical behavior are listed in Table 2. To test if participants expected people with more power over them to be more unethical than those who had the same amount of power, I conducted a one-way ANOVA with power as the independent variable—dummy-coded the same way as in Study 1 (i.e., 1 = more power, 0 = equal

Table 2: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations

	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	(1)	(2)
(1) Individual's Power	.49	.50	—	
(2) Expectations of Unethical Behavior	53.83	21.91	.12	—

Note. $N = 219$. Individual's Power is coded equal = 0, more = 1.

power)—and the expected probability of the allocator engaging in unethical behavior as the dependent variable. Participants reported that allocators who had more power had a higher probability of engaging in unethical behavior ($M = 56.57$, $SD = 23.30$) than allocators who had the same amount of power ($M = 51.16$, $SD = 20.22$), although this difference was only marginally significant $F(1, 218) = 3.38$, $p = .067$, $\eta^2 = .02$.

Discussion

In this study, I did not find statistically significant evidence that power positively influences expectations of people engaging in unethical behavior. Since later on I will test whether status moderates this effect, it is possible that the way I manipulated power may have somehow affected the perceived status of the allocator and caused a weaker relationship between power and expectations due to the influence of an unmeasured (in this study) moderator. Additionally, I had deliberately attempted to create a sense of ambiguity for participants by not letting them know which version of the game was being played. However, a consequence of this design was that from the perspective of a participant, there may have been a greater chance that the allocator would have a reason to lie about the version of the game if version two was the version being played. For example, if the version being played was version one, where all chips were worth the same amount to both players, there would be much less reason for the allocator to lie and say that it was version 2 that was being played, but if version two was being played, there would be more reason for the allocator to lie and say that it was version 1 so that the allocator could make an apparently fair proposal but still come out ahead. Thus, this is a more conservative test of the relationship between power and expectations of unethical

behavior. Further research using a similar design would likely benefit from informing all participants which version was being played so that they would recognize that in every case, allocators would at least have a self-serving incentive to lie, and then ask participants how much they would expect the allocator to lie.

Study 2b: Power, Expectations, and Trust Mediation Model

In this study, I tested the mediating role of expectations of (un)ethical behavior in the relationship between power and trust. This allowed for a retest of Hypothesis 1, which predicts a main effect between power and trust, and also tested Hypothesis 2, which predicts that people's expectations of another's ethical behavior mediate the negative relationship between that person's power and others' trust in him/her. To maintain consistency while building the full mediation model, these relationships were tested using the same bargaining game exercise used in Study 1 and Study 2a, although instead of recruiting participants from MTurk as in these previous studies, I sampled from a new population—undergraduate college students—in this study.

Participants

Based on the power analyses conducted by Fritz and MacKinnon (2007) specific to mediation analyses, and anticipating a small-to-medium effect size of both pathways in the model (i.e., independent variable to mediating variable and mediating variable to dependent variable), I recruited 202 participants for this study. These participants were recruited via the undergraduate management student participant pool at the University of Utah. Participants were undergraduate students currently enrolled in an introductory course in organizational behavior at the University of Utah who received required course

credit in return for their participation. Of the initial sample, 30 participants did not pass the attention check question and their data were subsequently removed from further analyses. The remaining 172 participants had an average age of 23.07 ($SD = 3.67$), and 36% were female. Seventy-four percent of participants reported as being White, 19% as Asian, 3% as Hispanic, 2% as Black, and 2% as other, and 24% of participants indicated that English was not their native language. They averaged 1.86 years of full-time work experience ($SD = 3.22$), and 69% said they were currently employed.

Design and Procedure

Participants read about the opportunity to participate in this laboratory study via an advertisement through an online study management system. They participated in 1 of 18 different half-hour sessions offered throughout the semester. At the scheduled start time, the experimenter began the session by reading instructions for the study and informing them that they would be playing one of two different roles in a decision making game. Even though participants also read detailed instructions on their own as they worked their way through the study, the goal of these initial instructions was to provide an overview for what they could expect. After listening to the instructions and receiving permission to begin, participants began the online survey and were randomly assigned to one of the two power conditions as described in Studies 1 and 2a. They also received information about the possibility for the allocator to engage in unethical behavior, the same as in Study 2a. Participants then answered a series of questions to ensure they understood the important elements of the game.

Before participants were assigned to their actual role for the study as either

allocator or recipient, they were asked to first imagine how they would feel if they were assigned to the role of recipient, reminding them that there was a 50% chance that this would be the actual role they would be assigned to (see Appendix D for actual wording of instructions). While imagining themselves as the recipient, they were asked to indicate how much they would expect the allocator to engage in unethical behavior during the exercise—using the same probability measure used in Study 2a—as well as how much they would trust the allocator, using the same single-item measure of trust as used in Study 1. These two measurements served as the main dependent variables in this study. After completing these measures, all of the necessary data to test Hypotheses 1 and 2 were collected; however, as in the previous studies, participants still completed the actual decision-making portion of the game in an effort to help increase the realism of the exercise.²

Results

Manipulation check. The manipulation check for this study was the same as in Study 1 and Study 2a to test whether the power manipulation was successful. In this study, a chi-square analysis indicated that the manipulation of power was successful, $\chi^2 = 101.20$, $p < .001$, Cramer's $V = .77$, indicating that participants recognized whether the allocator was more powerful, or had the same amount of power as they did.

Study results. Descriptive statistics and correlations among study variables are listed in Table 3. To test Hypothesis 2 regarding the mediating role of expectations of

² All participants were randomly assigned as either an allocator or recipient, and participated in a facilitated interaction with another person in the study session. The experimenter passed proposal and response information between anonymously matched participants. Allocators indicated the allocation amounts and which version was being played (either truthfully or falsely), and recipients indicated their acceptance or rejection of the offer.

Table 3: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations

	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)
(1) Individual's Power	.48	.50	—		
(2) Expectations of Unethical Behavior	58.78	20.37	.00	—	
(3) Trust	3.44	1.36	.08	-.51***	—

Note. $N = 172$. Individual's Power is coded equal = 0, more = 1.

*** $p < .001$.

(un)ethical behavior, I conducted a mediation analysis using a bootstrapping method (Preacher & Hayes, 2004; 2008). As in the previous studies, I used a dummy-coded variable for the two conditions of power (1 = more power, 0 = equal power) and used this power variable as the independent variable in this analysis. In addition, I used the same variables for the proposed mediating variable (expectations) and dependent variable (trust) that were used in the previous studies. Using 5,000 bootstrap samples generated a 95% bias-corrected confidence interval of [-.20, .22] for the indirect effect of power on trust through expectations of unethical behavior. Since the confidence interval does contain zero, this indicates that this indirect effect is not statistically significant, thus I did not find support for Hypothesis 2 that predicted that expectations of unethical behavior mediates the negative effect of power on trust.

Breaking the mediation model down into its individual components, I first attempted to replicate the results from Study 1 by testing Hypothesis 1 examining the effect of power on trust. I conducted an OLS linear regression analysis with power as the independent variable and trust as the dependent variable and found that there was no difference in the amount of trust participants had for the allocator, regardless of whether the allocator was equally or more powerful, $R^2 = .01$, $B = .20$, $SE = .21$, $t(171) = .98$, $p =$

.327. These results did not provide support for Hypothesis 1.

I then examined the link between the independent variable (power) and the mediating variable (expectations of unethical behavior) by conducting an OLS linear regression analysis with power as the independent variable and expectations of unethical behavior as the dependent variable. I found that regardless of whether participants faced an equally powerful allocator or a more powerful allocator, there was no difference in how much participants expected the allocator to behave unethically, $R^2 = .00$, $B = -.10$, $SE = 3.12$, $t(171) = -.03$, $p = .974$. From these results, the power of the allocator did not affect how much participants expected the allocator to engage in unethical behavior.

I also tested the second component of the mediation model by examining whether how much participants expected an allocator to engage in unethical behavior affected how much they trusted the allocator. I conducted an OLS linear regression analysis with the probability of the allocator engaging in unethical behavior as the independent variable and trust as the dependent variable and found a significant, negative relationship between expectations of unethical behavior and trust. Specifically, as the probability increased that another person would engage in unethical behavior, trust significantly decreased, $R^2 = .26$, $B = -.03$, $SE = .004$, $t(171) = -7.81$, $p < .001$. Thus, expectations of unethical behavior did have a significant impact on the amount of trust a person had for another.

Discussion

The data from this study did not support any of the hypotheses, and none of the analyses produced even marginally statistically significant results. However, one element of this study that is concerning is the large number of participants (15%) who failed the

attention check question, especially compared with the two previous studies where there were only 2% and 4% of participants who failed the check. The population from which participants in this study were sampled from—undergraduate college students—is different from the population sampled from in the first two studies, so small differences might be understandable, but having such a high percentage of participants who were not paying attention is concerning. However, their responses were excluded from analyses so even though there were more participants who failed the check in this study, it should not really have an impact on the results other than causing there to be a slightly smaller sample size. In the following two studies, it will be helpful to test these same variables of power, trust, and expectations, using different study designs and using different populations to determine whether the significant and marginally significant results from Studies 1 and 2a respectively were the result of type I error and the results in Study 2b are more representative of the actual phenomenon, or if the results in Study 2b are the result of type II error. Regardless, to this point, the results are mixed and will benefit from two additional studies to further examine the relationships between these variables.

There was one component of the mediation model that was significant, and that was the negative relationship between expectations of unethical behavior and trust. Specifically, the more participants expected someone to behave unethically, the less trusting they were of that person. Although this finding might seem fairly intuitive, it is important to recognize the key role that expectations of (un)ethical behavior play in judgments of trust.

Study 3: Moderated Mediation: The Moderating Role of Status

In this study, I tested the full mediation model, which provides an additional test of Hypotheses 1 and 2, and I also tested Hypotheses 3 and 4 by examining how status moderates the effect of power on expectations of unethical behavior, and the subsequent impact these variables have on judgments of trust. I tested these relationships in the context of a trust game, a common method used in trust research to examine people's trust and trusting behaviors (e.g., Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995; Burnham, McCabe, & Smith, 2000; Schweitzer et al., 2006). Study 3 employed a trust game paradigm where the participants played against a hypothetical counterpart who had relatively equal or more power, and who also had either a great deal of or very little status.

Participants

Based on a power analysis with a desired power level of .80, an alpha error probability of .05, and an effect size estimate of .20, I recruited 284 participants for this study through Amazon's Mechanical Turk as in Studies 1 and 2a. Similar to these previous studies, all participants were U.S. adults and each participant received \$.50 for participating in the study, which took participants on average just over 12 minutes to complete. In this study, there were 10 participants who did not successfully answer the attention check question and whose responses were subsequently removed from analysis. Of the remaining 274 participants, their average age was 38.17 years ($SD = 12.57$), and 52% were female. Eighty-four percent identified themselves as White, 6% as Black, 4% as Hispanic, 4% as Asian, and 2% as other. Participants had on average 13.37 years of full-time work experience ($SD = 11.97$), and 77% said that they were currently employed.

Fourteen percent held a postgraduate degree, 3% reported having some postgraduate experience, 35% held a bachelor's degree, and 35% had at least some college experience.

Design and Procedure

After providing their consent, participants were asked to imagine that they were an employee of company “XYZ.” They read that all employees in this company occupy one of two different roles—boss or subordinate—and they read descriptions of both of these roles, knowing that later on, they would be answering questions to make sure they understood the details of each role, and also knowing that they would eventually be assigned to one of them. The bosses were described as people with a great deal of power and influence in the organization, and the subordinates were described as being subject to the influence of the bosses because they had very little power and influence in the organization (see Appendix E for actual wording of instructions and manipulations). The wording used in these manipulations was similar to that used in other manipulations of power (e.g., Fragale et al., 2011; Galinsky et al., 2003). Although participants did not find out at this point which role they would be assigned to, ultimately all participants were assigned to play the role of subordinate, and they were randomly assigned to play the game with either another subordinate (i.e., condition where the other player was equally powerful) or the boss (i.e., condition where the other player was more powerful).

Before learning which role they would be assigned to, participants read about the rules and instructions of the hypothetical decision-making game they would be playing during the study (i.e., the trust game, c.f., Berg et al., 1995). This game was an adapted version of the trust game used by Schweitzer and colleagues (2006). In this game, there

were two players, the decider and the responder. Without knowing which role they would be assigned to, participants read that the decider begins the game with \$6 and has three different options for what to do with this money: 1) keep all \$6 for themselves and give \$0 to the responder, 2) split the \$6 evenly so that the decider keeps \$3 and gives \$3 to the responder, or 3) give all \$6 to the responder and keep \$0 for themselves. Participants further read that if the decider chooses option one or two, the game ends at that point. However, if the decider selects option 3 to pass all \$6 to the responder—the most trusting option—the total amount of money would triple to \$18. Additionally, the responder would then be given five new options to choose from regarding what to do with the \$18: 1) keep all \$18 and give \$0 to the decider, 2) keep \$12 and give \$6 back to the decider, 3) split the \$18 evenly, keeping \$9 and giving \$9 to the decider, 4) keep \$6 and give \$12 back to the decider, or 5) give all \$18 back to the decider and keep \$0 for themselves. Whichever option the responder chose would then result in the corresponding distribution and the game would end.

An additional adaptation to the original trust game was made in order to create a situation where the responder had an opportunity to engage in unethical behavior. After reading the preceding instructions, participants were told that in this game responders would be allowed to send a message to the decider letting the decider know which of the five options they would select if the decider would choose to give them all \$6 (this idea of sending a message to allow for an opportunity to engage in unethical behavior is based on the procedure used by Boles et al., 2000). They were told that this message would be sent prior to the decider making their initial decision. However, participants were also told that it would be possible for responders to lie when sending this message, since there

was no way for a decider to verify whether or not the responder will actually choose the option indicated in the message, nor were there any procedures in place in the study to punish any responders who lie. Thus, the message from the responder may or may not be truthful. After answering questions to ensure their understanding of the game and of each player, all participants were then informed they would be playing the role of subordinate, and that they would be the decider in the game.

In the previous three studies, participants were recipients interacting with equally or more powerful allocators. In this study, each participant was a subordinate decider, interacting with a responder who was either another subordinate or the boss. In the condition where participants faced a responder who was equally powerful, they learned that the responder was also a subordinate at Company XYZ and had the same amount of control over resources and people within the organization as they did. In the condition where participants faced a responder who was more powerful, the responder was described as the participant's boss at Company XYZ who had more control than the participant over valued resources and people in the organization.

In this study, I also manipulated the status of the responder. In the low-status condition, the responder—regardless of whether the responder was a subordinate or boss—was described as a person who was not very respected and admired by other members of Company XYZ, and whose opinions were not valued by other members of the organization. In the high-status condition, responders were described as being very respected and admired and whose opinions were valued by others within Company XYZ. These manipulations were the same used by Fragale et al. (2011) in their manipulation of status, and consistent with others who have also successfully manipulated status (e.g.,

Blader & Chen, 2012). Employing this 2 (equal, more power) X 2 (high, low status) design created four different conditions to which participants were randomly assigned, where the responder was: 1) a high-status subordinate, 2) a low-status subordinate, 3) a high-status boss, or 4) a low-status boss.

The game began with participants first completing the same measures of expectations of unethical behavior—the probability of the responder engaging in unethical behavior—and trust—how much they trusted the responder—as used in the previous studies. After completing these measures, all of the data necessary to test the hypotheses were collected, but as in the previous studies, participants still completed the trust game to help increase the realism of the exercise.³

Results

Manipulation checks. To determine whether the power manipulation was successful, all participants were given two options with which to complete the following sentence: “The responder I am playing this game with today is a person who has _____.” One response option was “the same amount of control over valued resources and people as I do in Company XYZ,” and the other option was “much more control over valued resources and people than I do in Company XYZ.” Results of a chi-square analysis demonstrated that the manipulations were successful in causing participants to view the responder as having equal or more power, $\chi^2 = 135.61, p < .001$, phi coefficient = .70.

To check the effectiveness of the status manipulation, participants were asked to

³ After receiving a message that the responder would evenly split the \$18, participants made their decision. Selecting options 1 or 2 ended the game. If they selected option 3, they were notified at the end of the study that the \$18 was split evenly.

indicate the extent to which they agreed with the statement “The responder I am playing this game with today is a person who is very highly respected and admired within Company XYZ,” with responses ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Using a one-way ANOVA with a dummy code for status condition as the independent variable (1 = high status, 0 = low status) and responses to the above question as the dependent variable, I was able to determine that participants in the low-status condition ($M = 2.74$, $SD = 2.02$) correctly recognized the low status of their responder, and that those in the high-status condition ($M = 5.99$, $SD = 1.33$) also correctly recognized the high status of their responder, and that these two conditions were significantly different $F(1, 273) = 247.74$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .48$. These results indicate that both the power and status manipulations were successful.

Study results. As in the previous studies, I created a dummy code for power (1 = more power, 0 = equal power) based on which condition participants were randomly assigned to. Descriptive statistics and correlations among all study variables are listed in Table 4. Although the main purpose of this study was to test Hypothesis 3, I also tested the other hypothesized relationships in my model, beginning with the relationship between the independent and dependent variables in this model. I conducted a one-way

Table 4: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations

	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(1) Individual's Power	.51	.50	—			
(2) Individual's Status	.50	.50	.00	—		
(3) Expectations of Unethical Behavior	48.67	26.14	-.04	-.52***	—	
(4) Trust	3.54	1.65	-.01	.38***	-.65***	—

Note. $N = 274$. Individual's Power is coded equal = 0, more = 1. Individual's Status is coded low = 0, high = 1.

*** $p < .001$.

ANOVA with the dummy-coded power variable as the independent variable, and the same measure of trust used in the previous studies as the dependent variable, and found that the amount of trust participants had of their equally powerful counterparts ($M = 3.55$, $SD = 1.66$) did not differ from the amount of trust participants had of their counterparts who were more powerful ($M = 3.53$, $SD = 1.64$), $F(1, 273) = .01$, $p = .937$, $\eta^2 = .00$. Thus, the results of Study 1 were not replicated as these results did not provide additional support for Hypothesis 1. I similarly tested the effect of power on expectations of unethical behavior—using the same measure as in the previous studies—and results indicated that participants expected more powerful counterparts to engage in the same amount of unethical behavior ($M = 47.70$, $SD = 26.32$) as they did of counterparts who were equally powerful ($M = 49.67$, $SD = 26.01$), $F(1, 273) = .39$, $p = .533$, $\eta^2 = .00$. These results are consistent with the nonsignificant results obtained in Studies 2a and 2b.

I also tested the mediation proposed in Hypothesis 2, and 5,000 bootstrap samples generated a 95% bias-corrected confidence interval of $[-.17, .33]$ for the indirect effect of power on trust through expectations of unethical behavior. Since the confidence interval does include zero, this indirect effect is not statistically significant and thus I did not find support for Hypothesis 2. Further analysis revealed that although the mediation was not significant, there was evidence for the same significant relationship between expectations of unethical behavior and trust as was seen in Study 2b, that the more participants expected their responder to behave unethically, the less they trusted the responder, $R^2 = .42$, $B = -10.25$, $SE = .735$, $t = -13.95$, $p < .001$.

To test Hypothesis 3 that an individual's status and power interact to affect others' expectations of this individual's unethical behavior, I conducted a 2 x 2 ANOVA

using the dummy-coded variables for power and status as the independent variables, and expectations of unethical behavior as the dependent variable. Although power did not have an independent effect on expectations of unethical behavior, status did have a unique effect, $F(1, 273) = 98.88, p < .001, \eta^2 = .27$. However, there was not a significant power x status interaction, $F(3, 271) = .47, p = .495, \eta^2 = .00$, thus these results did not provide support for Hypothesis 3. Since this interaction was not significant, Hypothesis 4, which predicts that status moderates the mediation predicted in Hypothesis 2, is also not supported. Indeed, using Hayes' (2012) PROCESS macro, 5,000 bootstrap iterations generated 95% confidence interval of $[-.30, .60]$, and since this confidence interval contains zero, this effect is not significant and these results do not provide support for the moderated mediation model predicted in Hypothesis 4.

In addition, I conducted some post-hoc analyses to further explore the relationships between power, status, trust, and unethical expectations. Although I had predicted that status would moderate the effect of power on expectations of others, as I did not find evidence of this relationship, I tested to see if there was a unique main effect of status on expectations of unethical behavior. I conducted a one-way ANOVA with status as the independent variable and expectations as the dependent variable and found that participants whose responder was described as having high status had lower expectations of that responder behaving unethically ($M = 35.27, SD = 23.15$) than did those whose responder was described as having low status ($M = 62.27, SD = 21.63$), $F(1, 273) = 99.47, p < .001, \eta^2 = .27$. Thus, in this study, status had a much stronger effect than did power on participants expectations of others engaging in unethical behavior.

Further exploratory analyses revealed a significant relationship between status

and trust, specifically that people had more trust for others who had high status ($M = 4.16$, $SD = 1.42$) than they did for those who had low status ($M = 2.91$, $SD = 1.63$), $F(1, 273) = 45.79$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .14$. With status as the independent variable, expectations as the mediator, and trust as the dependent variable, and using the same bootstrapping mediation analysis technique used previously, 5,000 bootstrap samples generated a 95% bias-corrected confidence interval of [.78, 1.36]. Since this confidence interval does not contain zero, the indirect effect of status on trust through expectations of unethical behavior was significant. Moreover, the total effect of status on trust—before the mediator is added to the model—was significant ($B = 1.25$, $p < .001$); however, after adding the mediator to the model, the direct effect of status on trust became non-significant ($B = .20$, $p = .252$). This is evidence that individuals' expectations of unethical behavior fully mediate the relationship between status and trust.

Discussion

Similar to the results in Study 2b, the results in this study provided no evidence in support of Hypotheses 1 and 2, despite using a different exercise and a different MTurk sample. However, also as in Study 2b, there was a significant negative relationship between expectations of unethical behavior and trust. Specifically, the more people expected a person to behave unethically, the less trusting people were of that person. Although this was not a hypothesized result, and even though it may not be an incredibly surprising finding, it is important to recognize the important role that expectations of unethical behavior play in forming trust judgments of others.

Additionally, the post-hoc analyses were very interesting and informative for

future research. Although there was no evidence of an interaction between power and status on expectations, status was found to exert its own unique effect on both trust and expectations of engaging in unethical behavior. Specifically, the more status a person had, the less he/she was expected to engage in unethical behavior, and the more he/she was trusted by participants. These expectations were also found to fully mediate the relationship between status and trust, providing some interesting insight into what a person's social status means in helping others form judgments of and attitudes towards that person.

Study 4: Power, Status, Expectations, and Trust in the Field

Almost all of the previous research that has examined the differential effects of power and status in the literature has manipulated these variables in the lab or in some kind of scenario study, similar to the way I have manipulated these variables in the previous four studies. Overbeck and Park (2006) cited the complexity and messiness of natural, real-world settings as a reason for their decision to utilize the laboratory setting to isolate the unique effects of power from other similar constructs such as dominance or status. Magee and Galinsky (2008) have similarly discussed the specific relationship between power and status and argued that “power and status can be causally related and mutually reinforcing: power can lead to status, and status can lead to power” (p. 364). However, Magee and Galinsky have also stated that “although power often begets status, and status can turn into power, there are times when one has status without power or power in the absence of status” (p. 364). Thus, even though these variables may covary, I argue that they are distinct constructs such that people within organizations are likely

able to recognize the difference between them, especially if asked about them separately using survey methods.

In this study, I conducted a survey study among a population of professional, fully employed business students where the variables of power and status were measured (though I also manipulated power as I will explain further below), and examined their relationships with expectations and trust. Respondents answered questions regarding individuals who were members of their actual organization, which allowed me to examine the relationships among power, status, trust, and expectations within actual organizations and among individuals with established and ongoing working relationships.

Participants

Participants for this study were fully employed students who were taking evening courses as part of a professional master's of business administration program. With prior approval from the instructors of these courses, and during times when they were discussing material related to power in organizations, I introduced the survey and provided students with an opportunity to participate and complete the survey during class. Students were not required to participate, but were asked—and encouraged—to do so. Although not all students volunteered to complete the survey, on average, 92% of the students in each of three different class sessions participated, for a total of 139 total responses. There were 2 students who began the survey but did not complete even enough information to measure the first potential dependent variable, so they were removed from the total sample, leaving a total sample size of 137 respondents. Their average age was 29.07 ($SD = 4.57$), and 32% were female. Ninety-one percent identified

themselves as White, 4% as Hispanic, 4% as Asian, and 1% as other. They had had an average of 6.30 years ($SD = 4.27$) of full-time work experience, and all had been with their current organization for an average of 3.24 years ($SD = 2.67$) and working in their current position for an average of 1.89 years ($SD = 1.60$).

Design and Procedure

After being introduced to the survey, all students received a link to access and complete the study online. For those who did not have access to an electronic device, they were given hard copies of the survey to complete. Across all three class sessions, all but 4 participants completed the study online.

Respondents learned that during the survey they would be answering questions about a person from the organization where they currently worked, and were then randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In one condition, they were asked to list the names of three people in their organization who were more powerful than themselves, and in the other condition, they were asked to list the names of three people who had the same amount of power as they did (see Appendix F for actual wording of instructions). In both conditions, one of those 3 individuals was randomly selected to be the target (i.e., the person that the respondent answered the questions about). Respondents then answered questions about the objective power of this person, as well as the amount of power the participants perceived this person to have (using the sense of power scale, adapted to ask about the target's power). They then answered questions about their perceived status of the target, using a measure adapted from Bendersky and Shah (2013). The same measure of expectations of unethical behavior from the previous studies were used here,

specifically the probability that another will engage in unethical behavior.⁴ Finally, to measure trust, respondents completed the same single-item measure as was used in the previous studies. Respondents finished the study by completing individual difference measures and providing demographic information.

Measures

Social status. Respondents reported their perceived social status of the target using an adapted scale from Bendersky and Shah (2013) by answering each of the following four questions: “How much do you respect this person?” “How much esteem do you have for this person?” “How prestigious do you perceive this person to be?” and “How much do you admire this person?” Responses ranged from 1 (very little) to 7 (very much) and were averaged to form a composite score of respondents’ perceptions of status of the target ($\alpha = .90$).

Results

To test Hypothesis 1, that power negatively impacts trust, I created dummy codes for the power of the target (1 = more power, 0 = equal power). Descriptive statistics and correlation among study variables are listed in Table 5. I conducted an OLS linear regression analysis with the dummy code for power as the independent variable and the same single-item measure of trust as the dependent variable. Results indicated that there was not a statistically significant difference between the amount of trust respondents had

⁴ In this study, I also measured expectations of unethical behavior using the 17-item scale from Akaah (1992). This scale lists specific behaviors and asks participants how much they would expect a person to engage in each behavior. However, in an effort to measure expectations consistently across all of the studies, I did not use this scale to test Hypotheses 2 and 3. However, see Appendix G for scale items and reliability.

Table 5: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations

	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(1) Power of Other	.49	.50	—			
(2) Expectations of Unethical Behavior	11.83	17.67	.18*	—		
(3) Trust	5.37	1.35	-.10	-.41***	—	
(4) Status	5.18	1.24	.02	-.31***	.72***	(.90)

Note. $N = 137$. Power of Other is coded equal = 0, more = 1. Scale reliability is given in parantheses.


* $p < .05$, *** $p < .001$.

for equally powerful co-workers compared to more powerful co-workers, $R^2 = .01$, $B = -.27$, $SE = .23$, $t(135) = -1.18$, $p = .240$. Thus, these results did not provide support for Hypothesis 1.

Next, I tested Hypothesis 2 to examine whether expectations of unethical behavior mediated the relationship between power and trust. Mirroring analyses used previously, I used a linear regression analysis to test the effect of power on expectations of unethical behavior, using power as the independent variable and expectations as the dependent variable, and found that people who thought about more powerful co-workers rated them as having a greater probability of engaging in unethical behavior than those who rated equally powerful co-workers, and this difference was significant, $R^2 = .03$, $B = 6.32$, $SE = 2.98$, $t(135) = 2.12$, $p = .036$. Furthermore, additional regression analyses demonstrated that the extent to which respondents expected their coworkers to engage in unethical behavior did have an effect on how much respondents trusted these individuals; specifically, the more they expected these individuals to behave unethically, the less respondents trusted them, $R^2 = .17$, $B = -.03$, $SE = .006$, $t(135) = -5.15$, $p < .001$. This was the case regardless of whether the target was more powerful, $R^2 = .18$, $B = -.03$, $SE = .008$, $t(65) = -3.78$, $p < .001$, or equally powerful, $R^2 = .12$, $B = -.03$, $SE = .011$, $t(69) = -$

3.07, $p = .003$. Using a bootstrapping approach to test the full mediation model, 5,000 iterations resulted in a 95% bias-corrected confidence interval of $[-.42, -.02]$ for the indirect effect ($-.17$) of power on trust, through expectations of unethical behavior (see Figure 3). Since the range of this confidence interval does not include zero, I conclude that this indirect effect is significant, thus providing support for Hypothesis 2.

Finally, I tested Hypothesis 3—that status moderates the positive relationship between power and expectations of unethical behavior—using a hierarchical regression analysis. In step 1, I tested a model that included both the dummy-coded variable for power (1 = more power, 0 = equal power) and the perceived status of the target as predictors in the model with expectations of unethical behavior as the dependent variable, $R^2 = .13$, $F(2, 134) = 10.29$, $p < .001$. In step 2, I added the power \times status interaction term to the model, and although the overall model remained significant, $R^2 = .15$, $F(3, 133) = 7.73$, $p < .001$, the interaction term was not significant ($p = .124$), and adding the interaction term to the model did not explain a significant additional amount of variance,



Note. $N = 136$. All values are unstandardized regression coefficients. The value in parentheses represents the coefficient before the mediator was included in the model.

† $p < .06$, *** $p < .001$.

Figure 3: The mediating effect of expectations of an individual's unethical behavior on the relationship between the individual's power on another's trust for that individual.

$\Delta R^2 = .02, p = .124$. The results of both steps are reported in Table 6. Thus, status did not significantly interact with power to affect people's expectations of unethical behavior, and thus Hypothesis 3 was not supported. Since the interaction was not significant, Hypothesis 4, which predicted that status moderates the mediation model hypothesized in Hypothesis 2, is also not supported. Indeed, using Hayes' (2012) PROCESS macro, 5,000 bootstrap samples generated a 95% confidence interval of $[-.05, .33]$, and since this interval contains zero, Hypothesis 4 was not supported. The trend was in the predicted direction—the conditional indirect effect of power on trust via expectations of unethical behavior was significant at low and mean (but not high) levels of status—but the difference between these effects was not significant.

To further explore the potential role of status, as in Study 3, I conducted a number of additional post-hoc analyses to better understand if and how status relates to power, trust, and expectations of unethical behavior in ways other than as was predicted in Hypothesis 3. Following the same pattern of testing the hypotheses as used above, I first tested the direct relationship between status and trust by regressing trust on status and

Table 6: Hierarchical Regression Analysis Examining Status as a Moderator

Variables	Step 1		Step 2	
	<i>B</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>t</i>
Power of Individual	6.57	2.32*	25.25	2.04*
Status of Individual	-4.51	-3.95***	-2.31	-1.27
Power x Status			-3.61	-1.55
R^2	.13***		.15***	
ΔR^2			.02	

Note. Dependent Variable = expectations of unethical behavior. *B* = unstandardized regression coefficient. Power of Individual is coded equal = 0, more = 1.

* $p < .05$, *** $p < .001$.

found that status does have a significant, positive effect on trust, $R^2 = .52$, $B = .79$, $SE = .07$, $t(134) = 12.16$, $p < .001$. Thus, the higher the status of the coworker, the more participants reportedly trusted him/her.⁵

I then tested to see if status had any effect on people's expectations of unethical behavior by regressing expectations on status. Linear regression results revealed that status has a negative effect on expectations of unethical behavior, $R^2 = .10$, $B = -4.45$, $SE = 1.16$, $t(135) = -3.84$, $p < .001$, such that the higher the perceived status of a target, the less he/she is expected to engage in unethical behavior. I further tested to see if the same mediation model found in Study 3, where status indirectly affects trust through expectations of unethical behavior, would also be evident in this sample. Since the 95% bias-corrected confidence interval generated from 5,000 bootstrap samples did not contain zero [.02, .15], it appears that status does have a significant indirect effect on trust, through expectations of unethical behavior. These analyses provide further evidence that status plays an important role in people's perceptions of and reactions to others.

Discussion

The data from this study provided support for Hypotheses 1 and 2, but did not provide support for Hypotheses 3 or 4. These results contribute to a complicated set of mixed results across all 5 studies. Although Study 1 supported the predictions made in Hypothesis 1, Studies 2b, 3, and 4 did not support these same predictions. Similar

⁵ Liking is a construct that is often correlated—theoretically and empirically—with status. This effect reported here remains statistically significant even when controlling for liking using a measure that specifically distinguishes liking from respect (Wojciszke, Abele, & Baryla, 2009), $B = .60$, $p < .001$, and the additional variance explained by status is also significant, $\Delta R^2 = .18$, $p < .001$. Respondents indicated their level of agreement with the following statements, "I have warm feelings about this person," "I like this person," and "I feel close to this person," ($\alpha = .86$).

seemingly contradictory results were also found for Hypothesis 2, and neither Studies 3 nor 4 found support for Hypotheses 3 and 4. Thus, with the results from this study, it is difficult to determine a pattern of consistent results across all 5 studies. There were many strengths of this study, but one of its greatest is the use of the sample of working adults and their evaluations of target others with whom they have existing and often established relationships. This provides a small amount of external validity to these findings by demonstrating their existence even in the midst of the messiness of the real world and within real organizations. One of the drawbacks of the study is the small sample size that was achieved; however, it is encouraging that despite a smaller sample size, there was still evidence of significant relationships among the variables of interest. This is encouraging for future research to know that despite the difficulties inherent in measuring and distinguishing power and status from each other, this differentiation is possible and each of these variables has a unique relationship with trust and expectations of unethical behavior.

CHAPTER 3

GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

In this dissertation, I have examined how power is perceived by others and can affect their perceptions and attitudes towards powerful individuals. The theoretical premise upon which I have based these arguments is that power can have a corruptive influence on those who achieve it (Keltner et al., 2003). I have specifically examined the influence that power can have on individuals' perceptions of how probable it is that a powerful person will engage in unethical behavior, as well as on how trusting people are of others who are powerful. Across five studies I found significant—although mixed—evidence for these relationships. In Study 1, individuals reported having less trust for people who had power over them than they did for people who had the same amount of power. However, in Studies 2b, 3, and 4, I did not find a significant relationship between power and trust. Study 4 showed that people expect that their more powerful coworkers (relative to themselves) will engage in more unethical behavior than their coworkers who have the same amount of power as they do within their organization, and that these expectations mediate the relationship between power and trust. Study 2a also provided marginal support for the argument that people expect more powerful others to engage in more unethical behavior than equally powerful others. However, results from Studies 2b and 3 did not support these arguments. In addition, I did not find evidence that power and status interact to affect individuals' expectations of a person's unethical behavior.

Although the results were mixed, the data demonstrated across all five studies that power, status, trust, and expectations are related to and can influence each other, even if the relationships are not as simple as had originally been hypothesized.

Despite the mixed results across these studies, one of the main takeaways from this research is the importance of studying power and status from an observer's perspective, and that the way observers perceive others can make a difference in how much they are willing to trust. Even though a person's power was not always predictive of trust, in all three studies in which expectations and trust were measured (i.e., 2b, 3, and 4), observers' expectations that a person would behave unethically caused them to have less trust for the person, prior to even knowing whether the person actually did engage in this behavior. The mixed results point to the potential for future research to determine moderating factors or situational influences that impact when power may have more of an impact on how much a person is trusted. However, the presence of significant effects—both direct and mediated—from participants in a hypothetical bargaining game and from people within actual organizations evaluating their actual coworkers, suggests that this phenomenon is not just simply a fluke, but an important issue that needs and deserves to be better understood within organizations and society. Especially from Study 4, it was encouraging to find that, despite the messiness of the real world (Overbeck & Park, 2006), people still recognized the differences between the power and status of individuals in their organizations and that these perceptions actually made a difference in their evaluations of others.

Theoretical Contributions

This research emphasizes the importance of examining the effects of power and status from multiple perspectives and not just from the perspective of a powerholder. Additionally, this research also highlights additional factors that can affect individuals' judgments of trust, especially factors that are not dependent on people's actual behaviors. I also highlight the importance of (un)ethical behavior and demonstrate how expectations of one's (un)ethical behavior, not just the (un)ethical behavior itself, can influence how people are perceived by others. Below I will discuss the unique theoretical contributions this research makes in each of these three areas of research, power and status, trust, and (un)ethical behavior.

Power and Status

Research on power has predominantly focused on the powerful, often at the expense of the experience of the powerless (Overbeck, 2010). Although some research on powerlessness has been done (Ashforth, 1989; Lippard, 1988; Overbeck et al., 2006; van Dijk & Vermunt, 2000), most of this literature highlights how feeling powerless, or actually being powerless, affects the attitudes and behaviors of those individuals who actually experience powerlessness. In my research, I do not focus on the experience of being powerless *per se*; I instead examine how the amount of power a person has over others can affect how that person is perceived by others of either equal or lesser power. In other words, if person A is the person who is powerless, most of the previous research has examined the effects of feeling or being powerless on person A. In my research, I examine the effect that person A's power has on another person B. This distinction is

important because although powerlessness may be more common in some domains than in others, power is ubiquitous in organizations (Brief & Smith-Crowe, forthcoming; Dépret & Fiske, 1993) and people interact with others who have power over them—such as their boss—on a very frequent basis. I contribute to this perspective by highlighting different ways that the amount of power a person has can affect the perceptions of those who are subjected to this power compared to those who have the same amount of power.

Two of the specific variables that I demonstrate, at least in some instances, can be influenced by a person's power are trust and expectations. Surprisingly, the power literature has not paid a great deal of attention to the relationship between power and trust, although I argue that this is in some ways a natural by-product of the way in which power has most commonly been studied (i.e., from the perspective of the powerholder). Thus, a major contribution of the research in this dissertation is simply to help the field recognize the importance and need to consider this alternative perspective. Moreover, much of the research on power has been conducted after priming people to feel powerful (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Duguid & Goncalo, 2012; Galinsky et al., 2003). In the bargaining game developed by van Dijk et al. (2004) that I used in the first three studies, there are actual power differences between the two players of the game. Using this game allowed me to specifically test how individuals reacted to a person who had actual power over them, mirroring the relationship of boss and subordinate in organizations. Thus, instead of simply feeling powerful or not, I was able to shed light on how people react when they are subjected to another person's power.

This research also helps shed light on the distinction between power and status, an understanding that has been called for by a number of researchers (Anicich, Fast, Halevy,

& Galinsky, 2016; Blader & Chen, 2014; Fast et al., 2012; Fast & Joshi, 2014). Even though the one hypothesis that I had regarding an interaction between these two variables was not statistically significant, in one study, the nature of the interaction was in the hypothesized direction. Indeed, in both studies that incorporated status, status had reliable and replicable effects on both expectations of unethical behavior (negatively related) and trust (positively related). Since the focus of this dissertation was on the effects and perceptions of power, these effects regarding status were not explicitly hypothesized; however, they are completely consistent with the theorizing behind the hypothesized interaction and with the predicted effects of status. Regardless of whether individuals reported personally having a greater respect and admiration for a real person with whom they worked, or learned how much status a person was perceived by others to have in a hypothetical exercise, status exerted the same effects on others' trust and expectations, which effects were opposite in direction to the effects that power had on these same variables.

Other research lends support to these findings that status seems to matter more than power for judgments of trust. For example, Blader and Chen (2012) predicted differential effects of power and status on people's enactment of justice towards others. They theorized that since status is necessarily conferred upon a person by others, status holders are motivated to be actively concerned about the impressions they cultivate with others and pay more attention to others' perceptions of them in order to maintain their high level of status, in this case by treating others more fairly. This is in opposition to those who are powerful because power—they argue—tends to liberate people from external pressures and causes them to be more focused on their own goals and ambitions

and less focused on the needs and perceptions of others, and thus be more willing to treat others unfairly. In terms of trust, it makes sense that people with high status would be more likely to engage in trustworthy behaviors, and be expected by others to engage in these types of behaviors, whereas the amount of power a person has may not send as strong a signal about whether his/her behaviors are more likely to be positive or negative, and thus have less influence on observers' judgments of trust.

Although previous research has examined relationships between status, power, trust, and expectations, an important way that the results from this research contribute to existing theory is by adopting and examining these relationships from an observer perspective. Interestingly, although status is defined as a property of observers (Magee & Galinsky, 2008), much of the research that examines status does so from the perspective of a high- and/or low-status actor. The research in this dissertation helps to shed some light on and is an attempt to encourage a better understanding of the effect that status has on the status grantor instead of the status grantee. Additionally, this research demonstrates that these effects occur whether the observer is the one who has directly granted the status or simply becomes aware of how a target is perceived by others. These results highlight how a target's status can affect outcomes for observers, and provide insight specifically into how the target's status might affect observers' other perceptions, attitudes, and even potentially behaviors in future research.

(Un)Ethical Behavior

Another aspect of the model I have tested pertains to people's expectations of others' (un)ethical behavior. Despite the explosion of research on (un)ethical behavior in

recent years, the research in this dissertation contributes to this field in much the same way as it does to the power literature. Much of research on ethical behavior focuses on the actor and on other factors that influence when and why actors engage in unethical behavior. The research in this dissertation contributes to existing theory by taking the perspective of an observer and examining an observer's perceptions of an actor's (un)ethicality, as well as how an observer reacts when they believe that an actor is likely to behave unethically. Even though results were marginal and mixed, providing an increased understanding of the importance of recognizing and better understanding this perspective is in itself a simple, yet important, theoretical contribution to this literature.

Another contribution this research makes is by demonstrating the importance that expectations of a person's potential unethical behavior can affect how that person is perceived by others. Regardless of where these expectations come from, this research showed that when they were present they had a significant impact on how a target was perceived, specifically in terms of trust. Although sometimes, and likely often, these perceptions come from observed behaviors of or from interactions with a person, even without these kinds of direct experiences with someone, these perceptions can still influence our attitudes towards them. Both power and status were shown to have an effect on a person's expected behavior, and thus recognizing the significant impact that power and status can have on important outcomes, such as behavioral expectations and trust, contributes to our understanding of how observers' perceptions of a person's ethical behavior influences their reactions towards another.

Finally, this research demonstrates the importance that people place on a person's perceived ethicality when granting them social status since status consistently showed

inverse relationships with expected unethical behavior. The literature describes social status as the extent to which a person is admired and respected, but it seems that embedded in these judgments are tacit expectations for the way a respected and admired person behaves. It is encouraging, despite all that we know about the prevalence of deliberate and unintentional unethical behavior that occurs in organizations, that we expect those whom we see as having high social status to engage in more ethical behavior. Perhaps this is because people are less willing to bestow social status on people who are known to engage in unethical behavior, and thus when others perceive someone as having high social status, they assume that he/she does not engage in those behaviors. Or maybe a person with higher social status is more likely to be viewed as representative of one's group, and group members are motivated to perceive this person in a positive—and more ethical—light, which would thus reflect more positively on the group as a whole. This is an important avenue for future research to better understand why higher social status leads to decreased expectations of an individual's unethical behavior.

This research also helps to illustrate and develop a more specific link between research on (un)ethical behavior and status by showing how a person's status affects others' perceptions of him/her, and that when there is a greater perception of unethicality, there is also a deficit of trust. This has been alluded to in previous trust literature with integrity argued to be one of three components of a person's trustworthiness (Mayer et al., 1995). Although part of a person's integrity pertains to perceived ethicality, this research has helped to identify the unique importance of a person's expected ethicality, and the effect that it can have on these perceptions of his/her status. Furthermore, it also illustrates why we need a better understanding of how these types of perceptions can

affect how others may respond to people and their actions.

Trust

Turning to trust, this research first and foremost helps illustrate how trust judgments can be influenced without having previous interactions with a person. Other trust literature, especially research that has examined relationships between power and trust, has typically shown how trust is influenced based on the interactions of people in differing positions of power (Kramer, 1996; 1999; Kramer & Lewicki, 2010). Although similar, the lack of interaction is an important distinction and difference that contributes to the existing theory regarding the basis of forming trust judgments (Kramer, 1999). I have shown that people do not need to have these kinds of experiences for them to decide how much they will trust a person, but that even characteristics that are inherent in a person's position are sufficient to influence these judgments of trust.

Trust is interesting in that it is so difficult to gain, and can take a long period of time to do so, but it can be lost very quickly. Indeed, in society we often hear phrases that talk of needing to "earn" a person's trust. Although this research was not necessarily motivated by a desire to understand where such phrases or wording comes from, this research does illustrate the need to earn others' trust, especially for those who occupy powerful positions within organizations. Recognizing that people can develop a lack of trust for someone with whom they have never interacted before helps demonstrate the need for additional research showing the types of behaviors, or organizational factors, that can affect others' levels of trust. This is especially true in light of the inconsistent results I found in this research. Although it is possible that the significant results I did

find were spurious, it is also possible that the relationship between power and trust is more nuanced, and that future research is needed to better understand how other factors might affect this relationship. For example, it may be that factors such as a trusting organizational climate, or even a person engaging in consistent positive behaviors, can help observers focus on another's status instead of on his/her position of power, and allow the more positive status judgment to positively influence trust instead of the more negatively perceived position of power.

One of the promising findings from this research was the positive influence that an individual's status had on others' judgments of trust. It appears that knowing that a person is well respected and admired inherently indicates that this person has engaged in trust-worthy behaviors. Although previous research has shown that in some instances people who lie can—at least in some dimension—be seen as more trustworthy (Levine & Schweitzer, 2015), it would be interesting to examine whether or not these types of behaviors would have an effect on the actor's perceived status. Additionally, it would be interesting to examine whether some elements of trustworthiness are more strongly tied to judgments of a person's status than others. For example, maybe being well respected and admired is more associated with a person's perceived integrity and benevolence, but not as much with his/her perceived ability/competence. Or, maybe all three of these elements of trustworthiness have unique relationships with and can help explain different aspects of a person's perceived status. The results from this research illustrate the need and utility of further exploring this relationship between status and trust.

Limitations and Future Directions

As with all research, this research has its limitations and it is important to recognize and acknowledge these limitations in order to best understand how to interpret the results presented in these studies. One of the main limitations to this research is the lack of consistently replicated findings supporting the various hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 was supported in one study, but it was not supported in three other studies; Hypothesis 2 was supported in one study but not in two other studies; and Hypotheses 3 and 4 were not supported. It was encouraging that the survey study, the only study that involved real relationships among real co-workers, was one of the studies that revealed significant results; however, this also underscores the need for further research to understand the differences across these studies and develop an even more precise understanding of the relationships between these variables.

Each of the studies conducted as part of this dissertation relied on self-report data to measure people's perceptions of others. This strict reliance on self-report data to measure each of the variables demonstrates the need for future research to examine these relationships using behavioral measures, particularly behavioral measures of trust. However, in addition to pointing to the need for additional research opportunities, it also presents the possibility for there to be common method bias. In an effort to help minimize the potential for common method bias, I gathered these data from multiple online samples, from undergraduate college students participating in a laboratory experiment, and a sample of working PMBA students. On their own, each of these individual samples has its own limitations. Studies 1, 2a, 2b, and 3 all relied on an experimental paradigm, the first three using the same bargaining game exercise, and the last using a similar trust

game paradigm. These four experimental studies have strong internal validity, but suffer from a lack of external validity. The fifth study, Study 4, although still reliant on self-report data, involves real relationships among real people and is thus stronger in external validity. Although there are still limitations inherent in each of the individual study designs selected, the combination of all five studies together is an effort to minimize the effects that inherently exist in each of them individually to create an overall story that is more consistent and meaningful as a whole.

An additional limitation of this research stems from the use of hypothetical games in the first four studies. Other bargaining games research has shown that high versus low stakes in these games can influence the outcomes of these exercises (Dickinson, 2000; Tompkinson & Bethwaite, 1995). The points in the bargaining game used in Studies 1, 2a, and 2b did not equate to any kind of actual rewards after completing the game. In the trust game, there was not an actual distribution of money to the participants based on the results of the game. In future research, it will be beneficial to engage in these, or similar exercises, using real money or rewards instead of having participants play hypothetical games to see if playing for real money or rewards changes people's expectations, trust, or other perceptions, attitudes, or behaviors.

In examining power within organizations, I have focused on positional power and instances when a person occupies a higher versus equal position within an organization or in a decision making game. However, there are many more types of power that could be examined beyond positional power. Indeed, in their classic work, French and Raven (1959) outline five specific bases of social power including reward, coercive, legitimate, referent, and expert. Using this terminology, I have focused on a person's legitimate

power in this research; however, it would be valuable to examine these other forms of power and explore the potential relationships that these other types of power may have with people's perceptions of trust, expectations, and status.

It is also important to pay attention to whose perspective is being studied. In this research, I have focused on the relationships between two individuals where one person either has power over another, or has the same amount of power as another, in either a boss/subordinate relationship or a peer-level relationship. An important avenue for future research in this area of inquiry is to test these relationships from the perspective of a third party, or someone who is not subject to another person's power. Indeed, it would be theoretically useful and interesting to understand whether these predictions would occur as a result of this direct boss/subordinate type of relationship, or if it is more generalizable to powerful people in general. It is fairly common in organizations for people to have a direct boss, and often a few others above them in their direct chain of command. However, there are a great deal more powerful people that a person is likely to come in contact with who are not necessarily direct superiors of that person, but who may be evaluated in the same manner in which powerful superiors were examined in this research. In these instances it would be valuable to understand how individuals perceive these powerful others in general—in terms of ethicality and trust—to determine whether these results are specific to the direct boss/subordinate relationship or extend to powerful individuals regardless of their relationship with a perceiver.

Since there are often these multiple levels of hierarchy within and throughout organizations, a single employee might consequently have multiple individuals who are in his/her direct chain of command and who have a varying amount of power over

him/her. For example, a call center agent might have a team lead who oversees his/her daily work performance, but that team lead might report to a supervisor who oversees a certain number of teams. This supervisor might be one of many who report to a specific department manager, a manager who might report to a director who oversees a number of related departments. This director might report to a vice president, who then reports to the president of the company, who ultimately is responsible to the CEO of the organization. In this example, this single call center agent has seven individuals who might be said to have power over him/her. The research in this dissertation simply compares a more powerful versus an equally powerful other. However, employees likely interact much more frequently with those who are closer to them in their chain of command, and it is possible that people might have different expectations of others and trust them differently depending on how close they are to the target. Would people be more willing to trust the CEO who has the most power in the organization and over them personally but who is also the most distant from them and with whom they have likely had the least amount of interaction with? Or would they be more willing to trust the person with whom they interact more frequently and personally know as opposed to a person they know mostly by title? These and other similar questions are great opportunities for future research to explore.

In this dissertation, status was hypothesized to have a moderating role on the relationship between power and expectations of unethical behavior; however, exploratory analyses revealed that status may play a more pivotal role in these relationships than originally anticipated. Although there was little evidence of status interacting with power, I did find that status uniquely and consistently predicted both expectations of unethical

behavior and trust. This provides some insight into the distinction between power and status, but more research is necessary to understand better why these differences were observed and the role that a person's perceived status plays in others' perceptions of him/her. Perhaps because power is so prevalent within organizations, it may be difficult to use as a cue upon which to base perceptions of others, whereas status is a subjective judgment (Magee & Galinsky, 2008) and may provide more information about the character of a person and thus provide a better gauge for how trustworthy he/she is likely to be and the types of behaviors in which he/she is likely to engage.

Interestingly, two previous studies that found interactions between power and status revealed differential results about whether power or status was the dominant factor in the interaction. Power had a stronger influence on individuals' enactment of justice (i.e., an actor's behaviors) (Blader & Chen, 2012). The positive effect they found for status on fair behavior only occurred when power was low, but not when power was high. In other research, Fragale and colleagues (2011) found that status had a stronger impact on observers' social judgments of others, which in this case was a person's perceived warmth. The negative effect they found for power on a person's perceived warmth only occurred when status was low, but not when status was high. It may be that power has a stronger effect than status on a person's behaviors, but that status has a stronger effect than power on observers' judgments of others.

The connection and relationship between status and trust is an area ripe for future research, especially how status is related to the three dimensions of trustworthiness—ability, benevolence, and integrity—which similarly measure how an individual is perceived (Mayer et al., 1995). It has already been argued and demonstrated that each of

these three aspects of trustworthiness have their own unique effects on people's trust judgments (Colquitt et al., 2007), but it would be interesting to explore if the significant relationship found between status and trust in this research could simply be explained by perceptions of the trustworthiness of the target, or if status perceptions account for an additional amount of variance in people's willingness to trust.

Practical Implications

It is important for those who occupy positions of power within organizations to recognize that, along with the fancy title or the higher salary that often accompany these positions, simply holding these powerful positions may cause people to not trust them as much as they would if they were not in a position of power within the organization. Power often has a corruptive influence on those who possess it (Keltner et al., 2003; Kipnis, 1972), and this fact is not lost on those who are subject to the influence of a powerful person, who sometimes expect that powerful people are more likely than others to engage in unethical behaviors. This research suggests that a powerful person will need to be careful if his/her subordinates begin to view him/her as more likely to behave unethically because in these studies, these negative expectations repeatedly resulted in less trust for these authority figures. Making a conscious effort to avoid even the appearance that they are engaging in unethical activity, perhaps by striving to engage in ethical leadership (Brown & Treviño, 2006; Brown, Treviño, & Harrison, 2005; Den Hartog, 2015), is likely to help boost the amount their subordinates are willing to trust them.

In addition, simply being aware that they may be trusted less by virtue of their

powerful position can be a potential motivator for powerful individuals to engage in specific behaviors that will help them to demonstrate their trustworthiness to their subordinates. For example, previous research has shown that authority figures who use fair (versus unfair) procedures are trusted more by their subordinates when there is little or no other information upon which subordinates are able to base their judgments of trust (van den Bos, Wilke, & Lind, 1998). Thus, recognizing that their subordinates are likely to trust them less, authority figures can make a conscious effort to engage in behaviors—such as using fair procedures—that will help to contradict this initial lack of trust. In other words, the more that powerful people are willing to engage in behaviors that will help increase their perceived status in the eyes of their subordinates, the more likely they will be perceived as ethical and the more they will be trusted.

Furthermore, it is helpful to recognize that we have a tendency to trust those whom we perceive to have high social status, and carry certain behavioral expectations of these people as well. Often this can be beneficial, helping decrease transaction costs and facilitating cooperation with these people, but it may also cause people to be less vigilant in monitoring these people's behaviors. Even simply knowing that a person is respected and admired by others is enough to cause others to trust them more. This is helpful especially for ethical leaders who want to create or increase the ethical climate of their workplace, who can work to increase the visibility and recognition of high-status people within organizations. This can help to influence the perceptions and behaviors of others within these organizations by motivating them to engage in the same types of ethical and trustworthy behaviors they expect of these other high-status individuals in order to increase their own social status within the organization as well.

Conclusion

The purpose of this research has been to understand how the amount of power a person has affects how he/she is perceived by others in terms of how ethical he/she is predicted to be and how much he/she can be trusted. Mixed results have shown that people report having less trust for those who have power over them and expect them to engage in unethical behavior more compared to those who have the same amount of power as themselves. On the other hand, people reported having more trust for individuals who had high status and expected that these people would engage in unethical behavior less. Trust is a fundamental yet fragile part of human interaction and it is important to recognize the characteristics that may be prone to facilitating or impeding trust between people in organizations. Power is such a common aspect of organizational life, but there are usually far fewer people who hold positions of power compared to those who do not, thus it is vital to develop an increased understanding of how less powerful people in organizations view their superiors, and what these superiors can do to have a positive influence on these perceptions. Ultimately, the goal is to understand how power is often perceived in an effort to help facilitate trust within organizations.

APPENDIX A

STUDY 1 – INSTRUCTIONS

Delta = 0 [condition when allocator and recipient have the same amount of power]

In this study you will be playing a hypothetical decision making game that has two roles, an **ALLOCATOR**, and a **RECIPIENT**. You will be assigned to play one of these roles. Please carefully read through the instructions and rules of this game. After the instructions, there will be a few questions to help make sure and check to see that you understand the instructions. Please click to the next screen to begin the instructions.

--Page Break--

The allocator begins this game with 100 “chips”. Each chip is worth a certain amount of money. The allocator’s job is to decide and make a proposal to the recipient for how to divide the chips between themselves and the recipient. The allocator can decide to keep all 100 chips, to give away all 100 chips, or split the chips up into any combination that equals 100 chips. Once the allocator makes a decision for how to divide the chips, this proposal is given to the recipient.

After receiving the proposal from the allocator, the recipient’s job is to decide whether to accept or reject the allocator’s proposal. If the recipient decides to accept the proposal, the chips are split exactly as proposed by the allocator and the game ends. If the recipient decides to reject the proposal, neither the allocator nor the recipient receive any chips and the game ends.

As you can see, in this game the allocator and the recipient have equal amounts of control: the allocator has complete control over the decision for proposing how to allocate the chips; the recipient has complete control over whether or not the allocation will actually occur.

Delta = 0.9 [condition when allocator has more power than the recipient]

In this study you will be playing a hypothetical decision making game that has two roles, an **ALLOCATOR**, and a **RECIPIENT**. You will be assigned to play one of these roles. Please carefully read through the instructions and rules of this game. After the instructions, there will be a few questions to help make sure and check to see that you understand the instructions. Please click to the next screen to begin the instructions.

--Page Break--

The allocator begins this game with 100 “chips”. Each chip is worth a certain amount of money. The allocator’s job is to decide and make a proposal to the recipient for how to divide the chips between themselves and the recipient. The allocator can decide to keep all 100 chips, to give away all 100 chips, or split the chips up into any combination that equals 100 chips. Once the allocator makes a decision for how to divide the chips, this proposal is given to the recipient.

After receiving the proposal from the allocator, the recipient’s job is to decide whether to accept or reject the allocator’s proposal. If the recipient decides to accept the proposal, the chips are split exactly as proposed by the allocator and the game ends. If the recipient decides to reject the proposal, the proposal is reduced by 10% and the reduced number of chips are allocated to both players. In other words, a rejection simply makes it so that both players receive 10% fewer chips than originally proposed, but the chips are still allocated to both players, after which the game ends.

As you can see, in this game the allocator has a lot more control than the recipient: the allocator has complete control over the decision for proposing how to allocate the chips; the recipient is only able to reduce the allocator’s proposal by 10%.

APPENDIX B

4-ITEM TRUST MEASURE (MAYER & DAVIS, 1999)

Scale Items

1. If I had my way, I wouldn't let the allocator have any influence over issues that are important to me. (reverse-coded)
2. I would be willing to let the allocator have complete control over my outcomes in this exercise.
3. I really wish I had a good way to keep an eye on the allocator. (reverse-coded)
4. I would be comfortable giving the allocator a task or problem which was critical to me, even if I could not monitor the allocator's actions.

Note: Responses ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree)

Cronbach's Alpha Values

Study 1:	0.71
Study 2b:	0.60
Study 3:	0.80
Study 4:	0.71

APPENDIX C

STUDY 2A – INSTRUCTIONS

Aside from these basic instructions, it is important to know that there are two different versions of this game you will be playing today, but you will only be playing one of these versions:

1. In **version one**, the chips that the allocator received are **worth the same number of points to the allocator as they are to the recipient**. For example, in this version if both players have 50 chips, and each chip is normally worth one point, both players' 50 chips would each be worth 50 points.
2. However, in **version two**, the chips are **worth double the number of points to the allocator as they are to the recipient**. For example, if both players have 50 chips, and each chip is normally worth one point, the **recipient's** 50 chips would be worth 50 points, but the **allocator's** 50 chips would be worth 100 points.

In this study today, **only the allocator will be told which version of the game is being played**. Allocators will be given this information before they make their proposals, thus they will be able to take this information into account prior to submitting their proposal to the recipients.

--Page Break--

Even though recipients will not be officially told which version of the game is being played, when an allocator submits a proposal, he/she will be asked to **send a message to the recipient** letting the recipient know which version is being played and whether the allocators' chips are worth the same amount as, or double the value of the recipients' chips.

However, please be aware that **it is possible for allocators to lie** to recipients when sending this message. In this study there is no way for recipients to verify whether the information in the message from the allocator is correct, nor is there any system in place to be able to punish allocators who give wrong information. Thus, just know that the information a recipient receives from an allocator may or may not be accurate.

APPENDIX D

STUDY 2B – INSTRUCTIONS

Before you are assigned to your actual role, we want you to first **imagine how you would feel if you were assigned to the role of recipient** in this game (there is a 50% chance that this will actually be the case for you!).

Please **answer the following questions imagining yourself as the recipient** interacting with the other person assigned as the allocator.

APPENDIX E

STUDY 3 – INSTRUCTIONS

Role Instructions

To begin this study, imagine that you are an employee who works for company “XYZ”. In company XYZ, all employees occupy one of two different roles: a **BOSS** or a **SUBORDINATE**. Please click below to read very brief descriptions of each role. Make sure to carefully read the descriptions of BOTH roles since you will be assigned to one of them and it is important for you to remember and be familiar with both roles.

--Page Break--

THE BOSS

A boss is a person who has a great deal of control over valued resources in this organization. Since they hold positions of authority, bosses also have a great deal of influence over their subordinates in this organization.

--Page Break--

THE SUBORDINATE

A subordinate is a person who has very little control over valued resources in this organization. Since they do not hold positions of authority, subordinates are subject to the influence of their bosses in this organization.

--Page Break--

You will now be asked two questions to help ensure that you understand and recognize the distinction between these two roles in company XYZ. Please select the most correct response from the options available.

Player Instructions

Before you are assigned to one of these two roles, you are first going to read the rules and instructions of the decision making game that you will be playing for this study. In this game there are two players. In addition to either being assigned as the boss or the subordinate, you will also be assigned as one of these two players. Make sure to read the

following instructions carefully since you will also be asked to answer a few questions afterwards to ensure that you understand how this game is to be played and the difference between the two players of the game.

--Page Break--

In this study you will be playing a hypothetical decision making game that involves two players, a **DECIDER**, and a **RESPONDER**. You will be assigned to play one of these two roles.

The decider begins the game with **\$6** and is given the following three options to choose from regarding what to do with the money:

1. Keep all \$6 and give \$0 to the responder. If this option is chosen, **the game ends** with the decider having \$6 and the responder having \$0.
2. Split the \$6 evenly so that the decider keeps \$3 and gives \$3 to the responder. If this option is chosen, **the game ends** with both players having \$3.
3. Give all \$6 to the responder and keep \$0. If this option is chosen, **the game does not end**, but **the amount of money triples to \$18**. The *responder* then has **\$18** and is given the following five options to choose from regarding what to do with this money:
 - i. Keep all \$18 and give \$0 to the decider.
 - ii. Keep \$12 and give \$6 to the decider.
 - iii. Split the \$18 evenly so that the responder keeps \$9 and gives \$9 to the decider.
 - iv. Keep \$6 and give \$12 to the decider.
 - v. Give all \$18 to the decider and keep \$0.

Once the responder chooses one of these five options, the money is distributed between the responder and decider according to the option that was chosen and the game ends.

--Page Break--

In this version of the game **responders will be given an opportunity to send a message** to the decider telling the decider which option they will select if the decider will choose to give all \$6 to them at the beginning. This message is sent before the decider makes the initial choice about what to do with the \$6.

However, please be aware that **it is possible for responders to lie** to the decider when sending this message. In this study there is no way for a decider to verify whether responders will actually choose the option they said they would choose in the message, nor is there any system in place to be able to punish responders who lie. Thus, just know that responders may not actually choose the option they say they will choose in their

message.

4 Conditions (*italics indicate wording differences depending on condition*)

For this exercise you have been selected to play the role of **subordinate**. Additionally, you have been selected to be the **decider** in the decision making game.

The responder who you will be playing with during this game is **also a subordinate/your boss**. Thus, you will be playing this game with a member of your organization (Company XYZ) that has *the same amount of control as/more control than* you do over valued resources and people (*including you*)⁶ within the organization.

Also within Company XYZ, this particular *subordinate/boss* is *highly/not very* respected and admired by other members of the organization, and as a result, this *subordinate/boss* *has/does not have* influence over others in the organization because they *value/do not value* this *subordinate's/boss's* opinions.

⁶ The addition “(including you)” was only present when the responder was described as “your boss.”

APPENDIX F

STUDY 4 – INSTRUCTIONS

In most organizations there are some positions/people who have more control over valuable resources than others. First, think of your own position and the amount of control you have within your organization. Now think of three other people who have *roughly the same amount of control as/more control than* you do over resources within your organization. List the names of these three people below. (even if it is difficult to think of three, please do your best to come up with three different people who fit this criteria and list their names below)

Note: Italics indicate wording differences depending on condition

Person 1 _____

Person 2 _____

Person 3 _____

--Page Break--

Now the system is going to randomly select one of these three people. After the system informs you which person has been selected, you will be asked a variety of questions about this person and about your perceptions of and relationship with this person in your organization. Please click below to find out which person you will be answering questions about.

APPENDIX G

17-ITEM MEASURE OF EXPECTATIONS OF UNETHICAL BEHAVIOR (AKAAH, 1992)

Scale Items

1. Use company services for personal use.
2. Pad an expense account up to 10%.
3. Give gifts/favors in exchange for preferential treatment.
4. Take longer than necessary to do a job.
5. Divulge confidential information.
6. Do personal business on company time.
7. Conceal his/her errors.
8. Pass blame for errors to an innocent co-worker.
9. Claim credit for someone else's work.
10. Falsify time/quality/quantity reports.
11. Pad an expense account more than 10%.
12. Call in sick to take a day off.
13. Authorize a subordinate to violate company rules.
14. Take company materials and supplies.
15. Accept gifts/favors in exchange for preferential treatment.
16. Take extra personal time (lunch hour, breaks, early departure).
17. Not report others' violations of company policies and rules.

Note: Responses ranged from 1 (never) to 7 (frequently)

Cronbach's Alpha

Study 4: 0.95

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